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University of Alberta

*Interpreting Nietzsche on Truth and Perspective*

by

*Leah Kathleen Armontrout Spencer*



A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of *Master of Arts*

Department of *Philosophy*

Edmonton, Alberta  
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University of Alberta

Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled *Interpreting Nietzsche on Truth and Perspective* submitted by Leah Kathleen Armontrout Spencer in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.





## Abstract

In this thesis I consider whether Nietzsche's perspectivism can be properly understood as a coherent theory of truth, by reference to the interpretation of Nietzsche's perspectivism by Maudemarie Clark in *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*. I argue that the presentation of perspectivism offered by Clark overlooks Nietzsche's view that the value of truth is a question of primary importance over that of the meaning of 'true'. I argue that Nietzsche's perspectivism is not the ultimate presentation of his views on truth, but the outcome of his critique of truth, which should be understood to include three aspects: a psychological critique of the will to truth, an epistemological critique of the ability to apprehend truth in itself, and an ontological critique of the existence of truth in itself. I conclude that by overlooking the psychological aspect, Clark is unable to make Nietzsche's critique of truth compatible with his assertions about perspective.





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## List of Abbreviations

Nietzsche's texts will be quoted from the following editions and cited in the text according to standard abbreviations of their English titles followed by section and paragraph numbers. The exception is 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,' complete in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the early 1870's, Translated and edited by Daniel Breazeale, 1979, Humanities Press, New Jersey, pages 79-81; cited as "TL". Abbreviations and editions are as follows:

- A: Twilight of the Idols/ The Anti-Christ, Trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Penguin Books, 1990.
- BGE: Beyond Good and Evil, Ed. and Trans. Marion Faber, Oxford University Press, 1998.
- BT: The Birth of Tragedy, complete in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, Ed. and Trans. Walter Kaufmann, Random House, 2000: 1-144.
- D: Daybreak, Trans. R.J. Hollingdale, Eds. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, Cambridge University Press, 1997
- EH: Ecce Homo, Trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Penguin Books, 1979.
- GM: On the Genealogy of Morality, Translated by Carol Deithe, Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- GS: The Gay Science, Trans. with commentary Walter Kaufmann, Random House Inc., 1974.
- HA: Human All Too Human, A Book for Free Spirits, Trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- TI: Twilight of the Idols/ The Anti-Christ, Trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Penguin Books, 1990
- UM: Untimely Meditations, Trans. R.J. Hollingdale, Ed. Daniel Breazeale, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- WTP: Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Will to Power, Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, Ed. with commentary by Walter Kaufmann, Random House Publishing, 1967.
- Z: Thus Spoke Zarathustra, complete in The Portable Nietzsche, Ed. and Trans. Walter Kaufmann, Viking Penguin Inc. 1982: 103-439.





## Introduction

Nietzsche's discussions on the nature of truth and knowledge offer a critical assessment of ontology and epistemology that is both radical and seemingly paradoxical. Nietzsche criticizes the meaning of truth as traditionally conceived by asking what is meant by 'truth' and 'truthfulness' and what is the value of the search for truth in itself, rather than defining the 'true'. His concern is then not with the possibility and character of a subject's knowledge of the world, but with the intelligibility of conceiving of knowledge and truth without the interpretive framework of perspective. On his view, there are no facts about the world independent of what comes to be through experience and interpretation. For Nietzsche, the question of truth is not the traditional question concerning facts about the world, but the value of truth to life. He criticizes the philosophical tradition for mistakenly according intrinsic value to truth at the expense of life. In other words, Nietzsche sees perspective as the very starting point for the possibility of knowledge and questions the need and intelligibility of the task of discovering truth beyond what has value and meaning for life and beyond all perspective. As such, he is not as concerned to offer a new definition of truth to replace inadequate definitions, as he is with questioning the very meaning of the search for truth in itself.

The paradox that arises from Nietzsche's discussions of truth and knowledge lies in the apparent contradiction between his critique of absolutism and truth-seeking on the one hand, and what would seem to be categorical assertions of his own truths about value, life, and the inescapability of perspective on the other, which serve his critique. Nietzsche then seems to be advancing his own ontological doctrine of perspectivism as 'truth' while criticizing all possible claims to 'truth in itself' as well as the need for truth at all. His perspectivism would then seem to rule out the idea that there can be some independent fact about the world at the same time that it





proclaims the inescapable fact of perspective and interpretation. The difficulty with Nietzsche's perspectivism is not in his offering a reformed version of truth following his critique, but in defining what is to be taken as reality in a way that undermines the significance of the traditional notion of truth itself. On its own terms, perspectivism becomes one of many possible interpretations of the world rather than a true description of it, but then offering perspectivism as the true description of the world would seem to lead to self-contradiction. For either perspectivism is itself only a perspective and not a philosophical doctrine at all, or it is a philosophical doctrine, but then the terms of which would seem to rule out its being asserted as such. The self-referential nature of perspectivism leads as well to the issue of how differing perspectives are to be compared to one another. Without truth in itself as the standard for the comparison of perspectives, there seems to be neither a basis for preferring one interpretation to another, nor for preferring perspectivism to a traditional theory of truth. This apparent incommensurability of perspectives makes perspectivism appear to be a version of relativism.

The purpose of this thesis is to consider the self-referential nature of perspectivism and its relationship to Nietzsche's critique of truth in order to determine if Nietzsche's perspectivism leads to self-contradiction and absurdity. To this end, I will consider the solution offered by Maudemarie Clark in her work *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*. Clark's solution to this issue is presently the most influential among those of main-stream interpreters. Clark attempts to work out the apparent contradictions in Nietzsche's Perspectivism by offering an account that considers Nietzsche's intellectual development from his early unpublished essay *On Truth and Lies in the Extramoral Sense* to the works prepared for publication immediately prior to his collapse and institutionalization. Clark argues that discussion of Nietzsche's critique of truth is essential to understanding his challenge of morality and value, as well as discussion of



apparently metaphysical doctrines such as the will to power and eternal return, as these can only be understood in terms of the outcome of his discussion of truth. For Clark, the key distinction to be made in interpreting perspectivism is between Nietzsche's critique of and rejection of metaphysics and what Clark terms, 'the falsification thesis'. This, for Clark, is Nietzsche's assertion that it is the character of human knowledge to involve illusion, deception, and falsification.

While I agree with Clark that this distinction is important for understanding perspectivism, I see these two aspects of Nietzsche's discussion to be part of a larger critique of truth advanced by Nietzsche and stemming from his critique of the *will* to truth, or what I term, the psychological aspect of his critique of truth. I see Clark's distinction to be between the epistemological aspect, in the case of the falsification thesis, and the ontological aspect, which she terms his rejection of metaphysics. On my view, Clark offers an account of two aspects of Nietzsche's critique of truth without adequate consideration of the third, and on my view most important, aspect of his critique.

The focus of Nietzsche's inquiry is neither epistemology nor ontology strictly speaking, and he would therefore be critical of the attempt to distinguish sharply among his experimental approaches to truth. However, by distinguishing Nietzsche's critique of truth into a psychological critique of the will to truth, an epistemological critique of the intelligibility of seeking truth, and an ontological critique concerned with questioning the intelligibility of 'truth in itself', the question of the consistency of offering perspectivism as a positive view becomes a question of how 'true' is to be interpreted in Nietzschean terms.

The first, the psychological critique of truth, questions the value of the search for truth in itself and the motivation of that search, focusing on the relationship between knowers and the





way 'truth' comes to be understood and valued as a result of interpretations of experience. The second and third of these, the epistemological and ontological critiques, take as their focus the more traditional questions concerning truth as the relationship between subjects and objects. The former questions the intelligibility of the idea of truth in itself as a goal for knowledge and the latter questions the intelligibility of the existence of a true world to be known. Nietzsche's critique as a whole then does not simply question the meaning of truth and how it is to be known, but the value of truth in itself as it relates to life and the interpretation of experience as it comes to be through life and interpretation. For Nietzsche, truth is not independent of inquiry and interaction and so does not constitute the ultimate goal of inquiry, it is one feature of the possibility of inquiry. Nietzsche's inquiry begins by questioning the meaning and value of truth in itself for the sake of establishing the highest values for life. Considered in this way, Nietzsche's critique serves to assert the primacy of perspective as the very condition of life while rejecting the idea of any absolute fact about the world, offering perspective then as a positive notion rather than a limitation on the possibility of knowledge.

The result of Nietzsche's critiques of both metaphysical realism and absolutism as well as his assertion of the primacy of perspective is that interpretations of his view of truth and knowledge attribute to him a doctrine of perspectivism, or the view that what is considered knowledge is not absolute, but only one interpretation of the world, thus blending his ontological and epistemological critiques with his psychological and seeking a definition of truth from within perspectivism.

A key difficulty with attributing perspectivism as a doctrine to Nietzsche is paucity of references to perspectivism in his writings. Perspectivism as a doctrine is explicitly mentioned in his published texts in only one instance, and appears only twice more in the unpublished



notebooks. Nietzsche however makes frequent reference to perspective, perspectivity, and interpretation, which point to perspectivism as a view that Nietzsche held. Taking a cue from the wealth of interpretation attributing perspectivism as a doctrine to Nietzsche, I will use the term 'perspectivism' to refer to the idea that there is not a single determined understanding of the world and that meaning and truth are ultimately dependent on perspective. I understand Nietzsche's perspectivism not as a claim about the way the world is to be understood in itself, but as a deliberate effort by Nietzsche to draw attention to the absurdity of non-relational knowledge, that is knowledge of the world that is unrelated to experience and judgments of value, as well as an effort to undermine the understanding of truth as intrinsically valuable. Nietzsche's perspectivism as I understand it is not a claim about the way the world is independent of interpretation, but Nietzsche's own answer to ontological and epistemological questions about truth, secondary to his psychological critique of truth. Nietzsche offers perspectivism as a theory of truth with the understanding that the question of the meaning of truth is constructed yet inescapable. Interpretations of Nietzsche's perspectivism therefore fall short by considering the truth of perspectivism out of the context of his psychological critique. A better interpretation would include all three aspects of his critique to resolve the issue of the self-contradictory nature of perspectivism.

One additional worry concerning Nietzsche scholarship as a whole is the division between the various commentators concerning the number of Nietzsche's writings to be included into the body of work to be interpreted at all. This issue encompasses two different ways of dividing the texts. On the one hand, Nietzsche's texts can be divided into early and late texts, where priority is given to those texts which seem to exhibit his most mature views, that is, those including and following *The Gay Science*, while his earlier works receive little attention. Taking





as a cue Nietzsche's references to the development of his views in places such as the preface to the second edition of *The Birth of Tragedy*, I see the distinction between early and late works as useful to understanding a development in Nietzsche's thought, but I believe that the early texts prove as useful to understanding Nietzsche as his later texts and as such, should not be discounted outright. The second issue relating to the texts is the split between accepting *only* those works prepared for publication by Nietzsche himself and considering *all* of his written work, including his extensive collection of personal notes and letters, as fair game for the discussion. For this account, I have chosen a combined approach, which gives priority to those texts prepared for publication, but looks to Nietzsche's notebooks as a source of clarification and support for the ideas in the published works. In both cases, I follow the lead of Maudemarie Clark, looking at the entire collection and offering priority to those works prepared for publication, yet allowing that his notebooks might provide valuable insight into his published views.

In addition to the issue of choosing texts to consider, interpretation of those texts is further confounded by Nietzsche's hyperbolic presentation and his rejection of truth in itself. The issue of interpreting Nietzsche's texts on their own terms is therefore problematic in light of his determination that interpretation and perspective serve as the ground for all inquiry and that interpretation is ultimately value-laden. In the spirit of Nietzsche's critique of truth, one cannot offer an interpretation of his work that claims to offer the correct statement of his views. Rather, interpretation of Nietzsche's views is offered as just that: interpretation. This difficulty does not, however, rule out interpretation all together. His discussions of careful readership<sup>1</sup> point to his offering a consistent and unified view and his concern that this message be understood. Much recent scholarship has therefore attempted to redefine the terms of his arguments to offer a less

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<sup>1</sup> D, preface, WS 128, 137



paradoxical, seemingly more consistent reading of his works.

In an effort to rescue Nietzsche from hopeless self-contradiction and absurdity, many of these attempts to make Nietzsche consistent superimpose more modern distinctions drawn in the various philosophical disciplines onto his writings in an effort to draw out undeveloped ideas in the texts that Nietzsche himself might not have even been aware of. Although this approach offers some insight into his morass of writings, it also often distorts, much as Nietzsche anticipated and regretted, his ideas into the various positions presupposed by their authors as those which must be accepted by Nietzsche in order to fit into their own ideal of what truth is to mean. I believe that a better interpretation of Nietzsche's perspectivism will be one that unifies each aspect of his critique, and attempts to make his references to truth, perspectivity, and interpretation consistent and meaningful on their own terms. Even if overarching consistency cannot be brought to Nietzsche's perspectivism, when looked at in these terms, perspectivism as a critique of the nature of knowledge and truth poses a challenge to traditional views that ought not be ignored.

In my view, Clark offers an analysis of Nietzsche that clearly defines the terms of his intellectual development and epistemological and ontological critiques of truth, but which offers a new definition of truth in Nietzschean terms without an adequate consideration of the connection of his epistemological and ontological critiques of truth to the psychological critique of the value of truth as an end in itself. To draw out the difficulties with Clark's account, I will consider first Nietzsche's critique of truth, distinguishing the psychological element of the critique from epistemological and ontological elements. Following this, I will consider the views of Arthur Danto and Alexander Nehamas and Clark's response to their interpretations of perspectivism to provide a background for her own analysis. I will then consider the solution Clark develops and



critically assess it based on recent responses to her view. The outcome of this will be to show that Clark's reading of Nietzsche focuses on two aspects of his critique at the expense of the third in her effort to show that the self-referential nature of perspectivism is not self-contradictory.





## Chapter One: Nietzsche's Critique of Truth

Nietzsche's discussion of truth is concerned with the way that truth is lived out in the world, rather than with a purely philosophical notion of truth in itself independent of the value it has for being in the world. Nietzsche's critique of truth therefore begins from the psychological angle, calling into question the need for a philosophical truth that has no practical application. The psychological critique of truth offers a genealogical account of the origins of truth to question the value of seeking truth in itself as a goal and ultimate determinant of the good life. In this, he questions the uncritical approach to truth-seeking, which approaches truth as a given to be sought, rather than questioning its usefulness or the reason it is sought. The psychological aspect of his critique of truth provides the background for his consideration of what truth is to mean, and his definition of reality as made and constituted through interpretation.

### 1.1 The Psychological Critique of Truth

Nietzsche announces his question concerning the value of truth and its usefulness to interpretation and inquiry at the outset of *Beyond Good and Evil*:

"The will to truth which will seduce us yet to many a risky venture, that famous truthfulness about which all philosophers to date have spoken with deference: what manner of questions has this will to truth presented for us! [ ] It is true that we paused for a long time to question the origin of this will, until we finally came to a complete stop at an even more basic question. We asked about the *value* of this will. Given that we want truth: why do we not prefer untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance?"<sup>2</sup>

Nietzsche here points out that the primary issue to consider concerning truth is the reason that truth is accorded value at all, rather than assuming the intrinsic worth of truth and seeking it in a world of objects. With this, Nietzsche shifts the focus of inquiry from skeptical questions concerning the possibility of knowledge and truth to the question of the value of the search for

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<sup>2</sup> BGE 1



truth in itself. His concern is with the need that humans have to seek truth at all. That is, he is concerned with the psychology of truth-seeking and the utility of truth for life. Nietzsche's point is that truth assumes a value that has yet to be called into question, yet at times this value has been given precedence over the value of life itself. As Nietzsche's primary concern is with practical value, he seeks an understanding of how that which furthers life can be replaced by the theoretical good of 'truth'. To consider the psychological aspect of truth-seeking, Nietzsche considers the possible motives driving the search for truth and offers a genealogical account of the origins of truth in which truth arises as a result of social contract. By offering a genealogy of truth, Nietzsche is able to describe how truth could have gained its value as well as consider the motivations for according such value to truth.

The purpose of Nietzsche's psychological critique of truth is to point out that in spite of being accorded intrinsic value; 'truth in itself' is always influenced by will and valuation. This assertion paves the way for his calling into question the possibility of knowing truth in itself and finally the intelligibility of the idea of truth in itself. To explicate the importance of the psychological critique to his perspectivism, I will consider Nietzsche's discussion of the value of the will to truth, followed by his discussion of the possible motives for truth-seeking and of the will to power, as well as his discussion of the ascetic ideal. Following this, I will discuss Nietzsche's genealogical account of truth and the question of the deceptiveness of dogmatism.

### ***1.1.1 The Value of the Will to Truth***

In both Z and GS Nietzsche announces the death of God, offering at the same time that the effects of belief in God are not so easily overcome:





“God is dead; but given the way of men, there may be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. –And we—we still have to vanquish his shadow, too.”<sup>3</sup>

In effect, Nietzsche’s point is that a belief in God is no longer the defining belief of the prevailing reality. This assertion is not only a statement concerning the state of Judeo-Christian religious belief, but also a statement about the state of belief in universality and the absolute. Without God, or a belief in the absolute, concepts containing universality, most specifically, the concept of truth, come under suspicion as well. Nietzsche connects faith in God with the value of truth in the following passage:

“From the very moment that faith in the God of the ascetic ideal is denied, *there is a new problem as well*: that of the *value* of truth. –The will to truth needs a critique—let us define our own task with this—, the value of truth is tentatively to be *called into question*...”<sup>4</sup>

Belief in God, or in an absolute, made belief in a single truth about the world, or some true description of the world a plausible notion, but questioning God means calling the value of truth into question as well. For Nietzsche, the question of truth is a question concerning the value of the will to truth, or the need for truth, rather than whether or not truth exists. He sees that the value accorded to truth is accorded as well to seeking truth, yet there seems to be no standard for assuming that either is valuable at all. Nietzsche’s question about the value of truth is therefore a question about why truth is to be sought when there is no absolute grounding the value of truth. In the *Gay Science*, he asks:

“*How we too are still pious*. This unconditional will to truth—what is it? Is it the will *not to allow oneself to be deceived*? Or is it the will *not to deceive*? For the will to truth could be interpreted in the second way, too—if only in the special case “I do not want to deceive myself” is subsumed under the generalization “I do not want to deceive.” But why not deceive? But why not allow oneself to be deceived? Consequently, ‘will to truth’ does not mean ‘I will not allow myself to be deceived’ but—there is no alternative—‘I will not deceive,

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<sup>3</sup> GS 108

<sup>4</sup> GM III 24 p.120



not even myself'; and with that we stand on moral ground... 'Will to truth', that might be a concealed will to death"<sup>5</sup>

While it is clear to Nietzsche that truth *is* considered valuable above all else, there seems to be no reason to accept it over the value of life, or any other value. Nietzsche offers that we have no understanding of the nature of this drive other than an understanding that truth is good and deception is evil. There is no obvious utility to truth or truth-seeking, as well as no obvious value over deception, except morally. However, with the death of God, morality loses its foothold as an absolute as well. There is no longer a means for determining what 'good' and 'evil' are to mean. Without an absolute standard for comparison, there seems to be no ground for according any more value to truth than to untruth, or for that matter, for according more value to any one thing over any other. Concepts such as 'good' or 'valuable' have lost their very meaning.

One difficulty facing Nietzsche's critique is that the critique is subject to its own reasoning. By changing the focus of his inquiry from the possibility of truth to the value of truth, he is questioning the very value of inquiry itself and including himself in his psychological study. Reason comes into question when the will to truth comes under suspicion, as the value of reason is connected to the value of truth. Nietzsche calls the value of reason into question in the following passage:

"Since only the last scenes of reconciliation and final accounting at the end of this long process rise to our consciousness, we suppose that *intelligere* must be something conciliatory, just, and good—something that stands essentially opposed to the instincts, while it is actually nothing but a *certain behavior of the instincts toward one another*."<sup>6</sup>

Reason, for Nietzsche, seems to be even more suspect than even truth as it is considered good as a means to gaining truth and knowledge unhindered by the instincts. However, Nietzsche sees no separation between the two. Nietzsche's question then, is why the instincts are seen as

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<sup>5</sup> GS 344

<sup>6</sup> GS 333



counter to reason, and how reason has become the higher value. He argues instead that the instincts guide reason, questioning the idea that reason can be used to determine worth:

“Just as the act of birth is scarcely relevant to the entire process and progress of heredity, so ‘consciousness’ is scarcely *opposite* to the instincts in any decisive sense—most of a philosopher’s conscious thinking is secretly guided and channeled into particular tracks by his instincts. Behind all logic, too and its apparent tyranny of movement, there are value judgments, or to speak more clearly, physiological demands for the preservation of a particular kind of life.”<sup>7</sup>

He sees instincts as useful to preserving life as well as guiding the types of value judgments that accord truth or value to interpretations of experience. His claim in BGE 1, above, presses his point about negotiating a standard for comparison by pointing out the difficulties presented by the will to truth. Without God, Nietzsche takes life, and the preservation of life, as a standard for value judgments, but not only has truth failed to prove beneficial to life, it has even proven to be life-denying. Truth is offered as a highest value, but when considered according to a different standard, which is possible in the absence of the absolute, it seems to be of little use. Having no explicit value of its own, Nietzsche considers that the will to truth must serve some psychological need, and so that the motivations for the will to truth must also be suspect.

### **1.1.2 The Motivation for Truth-Seeking and the Will to Power**

In BGE 22, Nietzsche considers the idea that the seeking and expression of power could be the unifying aspect of experience:

“But as I say, this is interpretation, not text: and someone could come along with the opposite intention and interpretive skill who, looking at the very same nature and referring to the very same phenomena, would read out of it the ruthlessly tyrannical and unrelenting assertion of power claims. Such an interpreter would put to you the universality and unconditionality in all ‘will to power’ in such a way that virtually every word, even the word ‘tyranny’, would ultimately appear useless or at least as only a modifying, mitigating metaphor—as too human. Yet this philosopher, too, would end by making the same claims for his world as you others do for yours, namely that its course is ‘necessary’ and ‘predictable’, *not* because laws are at work in it, but rather because laws are absolutely lacking, and in every moment every

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<sup>7</sup> BGE 3





power draws its final consequence. And given that he too is just interpreting—and you'll be eager to raise that objection won't you?—then, all the better.”<sup>8</sup>

Following this possibility, the value of the will to truth is related to the feeling of power over the self and others, resulting from expressing and imposing one's values in the form of metaphysical assertions. He determines that humans seek truth not only as a means of explaining the world in which they live, but as a means to gain power over the self as well as, in the case of dogmatic worldviews such as Platonism or Christianity, to gain power over others. He offers the *will to power* as an alternative standard of valuation, considering that power could be as valuable as truth, or even the basis for the will to truth. He thus offers a different interpretation of value, which could be taken as a more apt description of experience, or one that better meets standards of judgment. To illustrate this possibility, he likens the joy of mastery of the world through interpretation and assertions of truth to a triumph of the will over the senses,

“[ ] the magic of the Platonic method consisted precisely in its resistance to sensuality, for this was an *aristocratic* method, practiced by people who may have enjoyed sense even stronger and more clamorous than those of our contemporaries, but who sought a higher triumph by mastering them, by tossing over this colorful confusion of the senses, the pale, cold, gray, nets of concepts. There was a kind of *enjoyment* in Plato's manner of overpowering and interpreting the world...”<sup>9</sup>

The use of reason here takes on the character of subjugating experience to one's values and attempting to overcome the limitations of knowledge by asserting an absolute. Asserting truth takes on the character of a means to the expression of one's will, such that the will to truth is given the precedence over the truth sought. Truth-seeking itself then gains value as an expression of power, rather than a means to truth. As with the thrill of hunting, he claims,

“... there is a certain drive to dialectical investigation, the huntsman's joy in following the sly fox's path in the realm of thought, so that it is not really truth that is sought, but the seeking itself, and the main pleasure consists in the cunning tracking, encircling and correct killing. [ ]

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<sup>8</sup> BGE 22

<sup>9</sup> BGE 14



Then, the man of learning is to a great extent also motivated by the discovery of *certain* 'truths', motivated that is by his subjection to certain ruling persons, castes, opinions, churches, governments: he feels it is to his advantage to bring 'truth' over to their side"<sup>10</sup>

Truth here is offered as falsification and selection, but for the purpose of presenting a specific viewpoint as the truth, or making a value judgment prior to determining what is to count as true, and showing how this 'truth' supports particular values. By connecting a particular interpretation with the absolute by calling it 'true', one gains power over others as well as the power to determine what counts as true. As with the example of the value of reason above, when reason became the means for gaining 'truth' it gained its status as the only correct way to interpret experience as well as becoming 'good' and opposed to instinct, given the character of an evil. Nietzsche sees one of the mistakes of philosophy to be the assumption that there can be such opposites as 'good' and 'evil' without questioning the ground of opposition, as illustrated in the following,

"For may there not be doubt, first of all, whether opposites even exist and, second, whether those popular value judgments and value oppositions upon which metaphysicians have placed their seal may be no more than foreground evaluations, temporary perspectives, viewed from out of a corner perhaps, or up from underneath, a perspective from below?"<sup>11</sup>

Understanding on this account becomes the explication of an object from a particular point of view, rather than the triumph of reason over the limitations of cognition. Understanding then is not the final working out of a true interpretation, but reconciliation between instincts to determine what is to count as true. The imposition of will makes truth, on this account, and the will to truth conceals the will to power.

### **1.1.3 The Ascetic ideal**

Underlying the will to truth as well, Nietzsche determines, is the human need for the purifying

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<sup>10</sup> UM, *Schopenhauer as Educator*, p.170

<sup>11</sup> BGE 2





of the spirit in search of a higher ideal. This would be an attempt to separate the body from the spirit in an attempt to discover the essence or essential nature of the world. This separation would be a casting off of the 'evil' from the 'good' in an effort to overcome the limitations of understanding. The outcome of this attempt at purification is a denial of the world of experience and life itself. By choosing to malign the physical in search of something more pure, the search for truth in the ultimate essence of things amounts to according more value to the ideal and the seeking of that ideal, than the life that ideal can be sought in. This amounts to taking that which was instrumentally valuable for life and giving it intrinsic value, with the result that life is set aside as less essential than the construction. Nietzsche refers to the denial of life as the *ascetic ideal*, relating the priest's self-denial to the philosopher's search for truth:

"If one considers that the philosopher is, in virtually all nations, only the further development of the priestly type, one is no longer surprised to discover this heirloom of the priest, *self-deceptive fraudulence*. [ ] What does a priest care about *science*! He is above it!—And the priest has hitherto *ruled*!—He has determined the concept 'true' and 'untrue'!..."<sup>12</sup>

The third essay of the *Genealogy of Morals* takes as its focus the ascetic ideal.

Ultimately, Nietzsche concludes, the love of truth is a form of self-love, and the existence of the philosopher is affirmed in the self-denial of the ascetic ideal. Exercising power over oneself for the sake of philosophy is affirming one's existence and importance. The culmination of the psychological aspect of Nietzsche's critique is the assertion of the philosopher's ascetic ideal, and its use in affirmation of existence through the denial of human activity:

"Every animal, including the *bête philosophe*, instinctively strives for an optimum of favorable conditions in which fully to release his power and achieve his maximum of power-sensation; every animal abhors equally instinctively, with an acute sense of smell which is 'higher than all reason', any kind of disturbance and hindrance which blocks or could block his path to the optimum. [ ] Consequently, what does the ascetic ideal mean for the philosopher?...on seeing an ascetic ideal, the philosopher smiles because he sees the highest and boldest intellectuality – he does not deny existence by doing so, but rather affirms *his* existence and

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<sup>12</sup> A 12



only his existence, and possibly does this to the point where he is not far from making the outrageous wish: *pereat mundus, fiat philosophia, fiat philosophus, fiam!*...”<sup>13</sup>

The psychological element links the will to truth as well as the ascetic ideal to the will to power by offering the will to truth as an expression of power and assertion of existence. The will to truth, in spite of the deception of asserting truth, feeds the feeling of power of the interpreter of the world, in one sense of the will to power, but it is also the expression of the character of the world as essentially changing and interpreting according to domination and force. By offering a critique of the *will* to truth in the face the deceptive character of knowledge, Nietzsche leaves open the possibility that interpretations are the only means of understanding and knowledge, and the possibility for his own interpretation of the world: as perspective, or the will to power.

#### **1.1.4 The Development of Truth as a Value**

As with his critique of morality, Nietzsche offers a genealogical account of the development of truth in order to point out the absurdity of taking truth to be an end in itself with meaning beyond that invested through interpretation, according meaning to life only in connection to discovering truth. His concern with the psychological development of truth as a value points to his concern with practical implications of knowing for our mode of being in the world, rather than the relationship of a subject to various objects of knowledge. Nietzsche rejects the idea that our understanding of the world is able to explain some transcendent reality about the world. He argues that logic, language, and scientific discoveries are invented meanings of the world, which are useful to the development and sustenance of a particular species, that is, the human species. Any attribution of laws and uniformity to the world is a way of limiting experience to see its variety as unified and common. As such, any interpretation of the world involves some form of falsification in ignoring certain aspects to attribute value to others, making the world

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<sup>13</sup> GM III 7



understandable to our sort of creature, but not explaining some reality about the world. He explains,

“Because we have for millennia made moral, aesthetic, religious demands on the world, looked upon it with blind desire, passion or fear, and abandoned ourselves to the bad habits of illogical thinking, this world had gradually become so marvelously variegated, frightful, meaningful, soulful, it has acquired color—but we have been the colorists: it is the human intellect that has made appearance appear and transported its erroneous basic conceptions into things.”<sup>14</sup>

What we understand about the world then, is imprinted on our experience to suit our needs, and our interpretations serve our experiences and shape what we take to be true. Nietzsche is not suggesting that our cognition changes the world by making it over in our image, but that we interpret our experience relative to our past experiences and what we take to be true. He sees this need to interpret as stemming from an early need to create well functioning societies, societies that later forgot that the systems of language were created by them, and mistakenly seeking correspondence to the world. Nietzsche offers the beginnings of his genealogical account of truth in the unpublished essay, *On Truth and Lies in the Extramoral Sense*, explaining the need for rules between individuals, and the ultimate establishment of the value of truth:

“Insofar as the individual wants to maintain himself against other individuals, he will under natural circumstances employ the intellect mainly for dissimulation. But at the same time, from boredom and necessity, man wishes to exist socially and with the herd; therefore, he needs to make peace and strives accordingly to banish from his world at least the most flagrant *bellum omni contra omnes*. This peace treaty brings in its wake something which appears to be the first step towards acquiring that puzzling truth drive: to wit that which shall count as ‘truth’ from now on is established. That is to say, a uniformly valid and binding designation is invented for things, and this legislation of language likewise establishes the first laws of truth.”<sup>15</sup>

Nietzsche’s allusion to Hobbes in this passage brings out the image of truth as a socially constructed object, meant to further the interests of a certain type of knower. Nietzsche offers the

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<sup>14</sup> HA 16

<sup>15</sup> TL p.81





idea that in order to get along with and understand one another, uniform designations were required to distinguish between truth and deception. Humans would then have established truth as a means for formation of a society, in which laws serve to establish predictability in human interaction. By designating certain things as true, humans are able to act uniformly in relation to one another. Nietzsche defines “lying” as misuse of these designations and truth as using them uniformly. Over time, we ignore and forget that our designators do not originate in a true world depicted by our interpretations of it, coming to believe that “truth” is a feature of the world independent of cognition. This forgetfulness of the origin of truth is the key issue, as indicated by Nietzsche in the following passage:

“the ‘lawfulness of nature’ that you physicists speak about so proudly, as if...--this exists only by grace of your interpretations, your bad ‘philology’; it is not a factual matter, not a ‘text’, but rather no more than a naïve humanitarian concoction, a contortion of meaning that allows you to succeed in accommodating the democratic instincts of the modern soul!”<sup>16</sup>

Nietzsche here points out that believing in order and laws does not make them a feature of the world beyond their usefulness to understanding. At the same time, Nietzsche offers, humans understood that their senses could be deceptive, and as a result invented logic and reason to connect themselves with the invented real world beyond the apparent world of the deceptive senses. From socially constructed origins, logic and reason come to be valued as well for their contribution to truth. Forgetfulness of the constructed, interpretive origins of the truth is the great mistake of philosophy, on this genealogical account. Nietzsche indicates that this interpretation is also a reflection on his own view, and cannot be understood as a statement about the world independent of a perspective. His genealogical account of knowledge is thus turned back towards itself and his other assertions about the world.

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<sup>16</sup> BGE 22



In the above passage, Nietzsche is making a claim about the way we understand the world and believe that there can be an interpretation of being. The traditional philosophical prejudice for being over becoming leads us to understand a 'true being' existing behind our interpretations of becoming, and Nietzsche's concern is to show that this belief conceals subjective motives and values. Ideas such as that of the "lawfulness of nature" are not themselves features of the world that can be understood to exist separately from interpretation. Nietzsche argues that we attribute similarity to objects and identify them as instances of the very same things by looking past all of their differences and picking out a few similar components. From this, we infer that there are many instances of the same kinds of things. We also infer opposites, order, and a causal relationship between events. Interpreting the world, we make it over in our image, that is, we anthropomorphize the world with human beings as its very measure. Nietzsche sees this as creating a world for ourselves and making the meaning that it has for us, through our interpretations of it. Our knowledge of the world is essentially related to our understanding of our experiences and determination of what is to count as true within the realm of human discourse. When Nietzsche claims,

"We possess scientific knowledge today precisely to the extent that we have decided to *accept* the evidence of the senses – to the extent that we have learned to sharpen and arm them and think them through to their conclusions."<sup>17</sup>

he makes a point about our choice of descriptions of experience, following his discussion of what is taken as true, or taken as knowledge for human knowers. By offering a discussion of the origin of truth in contrast to its current usage, Nietzsche indicates the value-laden character of the designators of truth, thus calling into question not only what is valued as true, but also the need to create such a valuation at all. What is taken as true is not necessarily a conscious choice, nor

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<sup>17</sup> TI Reason,3



can a different interpretation necessarily be chosen. Interpretations of experience and that which is taken as true informs the very process of inquiry and determines what will be accorded value in further interpretation. As a result, any knowledge that is culled from experience of the world is subject to the same sorts of criticisms.

Nietzsche's own view is not exempt from this analysis and criticism, nor does he intend for it to be so. His genealogical account of philosophical inquiry is not an attempt to explain the world better than previous philosophers have, nor offer a refutation of universal views that is itself universal. Instead, his discussion seeks to undermine truth-seeking and the concept of truth in itself by considering the psychological bias for truth to determine the purpose it serves.

Nietzsche's concern is not with offering a new account of what is true about the world, and so the question of the truth or falsity of his account of the will to power and the genealogy of truth is secondary to his primary concern with the *utility* of truth.

### **1.1.5 The Deception of Dogmatism**

Assuming that truth is intrinsically valuable, or that knowing truth in itself is an end in itself, Nietzsche declares above<sup>18</sup>, is to have forgotten the origins of knowledge and its relationship to value. Understanding one's position as unlimited by one's own values is a deception not only concerning truth, but a deception about one's own values. The interpretations that we accept as true once we forget the interpretive character of truth inform our further interpretation of experience. Just as our moral judgments follow from what we believe to be correct and right, our very existence and cognition are shaped by our past experiences and what is understood as true. Nietzsche explains that a study of morality is useful for understanding what is taken as true and asserted as a judgment of value when he makes the claim,

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<sup>18</sup> BGE 22





“But as semeiotics [moral language] remains of incalculable value: it reveals, to the informed man at least, the most precious realities of cultures and inner worlds which did not *know* enough to ‘understand’ themselves.”<sup>19</sup>

Like morality, truth has value only in the context of understanding, and one deceives oneself about one’s own values when making assertions about the nature of the world, failing to see those assertions as the views of a particular viewpoint, or the final domination of one set of values over others. Moral judgments arise from our metaphysical conceptions of the world, but such conceptions are also driven by the values within a given perspective. This point is illustrated by his claim that,

“All that has hitherto made metaphysical assumptions valuable, terrible, delightful to them, all that has begotten these assumptions, is passion, error and self-deception; the worst of all methods of acquiring knowledge, not the best of all, have taught belief in them.”<sup>20</sup>

For Nietzsche, therefore, when we believe our metaphysical assertions to be offering some truth about the world, our methods for justifying those beliefs fall victim to our value judgments as well. Essentially, what we take to be true is the result of the structure of values that we already carry with us, that is,

“A person’s value judgments reveal something about how his soul is structured, and what, in its view constitutes the conditions essential to its life, its real necessity.”<sup>21</sup>

Evaluating interpretations involves yet another determination of value on top of what we have already chosen to accept. On Nietzsche’s view, the error and deception involved in our assuming that we are making an absolute judgment independent of our own values are features of human knowledge not only in the sense that we must choose what to accept as true, but also because all such choosing involves an assumption of what might count as valuable. We might become aware of this, as we determine that our scientific proofs and use of logic and language involve a

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<sup>19</sup> TI Improvers 1

<sup>20</sup> HA 9

<sup>21</sup> BGE 268



determination of axioms but we cannot overcome our continued valuing and interpretation, or as Nietzsche expresses,

“If we had not welcomed the art and invented this kind of cult of the untrue, then the realization of general untruth and mendaciousness that now comes to us through science – the realization that delusion and error are conditions of human knowledge and sensation -- would be utterly unbearable.”<sup>22</sup>

In order to have knowledge, falsification in some form is required. This is not an indication that all knowledge makes false claims about objects in the world, or simply ‘gets it wrong’ about some feature of the world. This refers to Nietzsche’s point that all understanding comes from within some inevitable conceptual framework. Even with the understanding that assumptions of value are made in order for understanding to begin, they are not something that can be eliminated from cognitive practice. Nietzsche’s relation of truth claims to the utility of truth for understanding thus serves to elucidate his view that all understanding requires some falsification, both by means of selectivity and by the necessity of making value judgments concerning the scope and character of knowledge, even in the case of his own assessment of the character of understanding. If understanding is necessarily deceptive, the need and drive for knowledge becomes questionable in its own right, even if inescapable.<sup>23</sup>

## 1.2 Epistemological Critique of Truth

With the psychological aspect of his critique of truth, Nietzsche offers an account of the origins of the notion of truth to call into question the motives for seeking truth at all, as well as question the value assigned to truth. With his genealogy of truth, he also calls into question the possibility that truth in itself *could* be known, and whether truth as the goal of inquiry is even

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<sup>22</sup> GS 107

<sup>23</sup> In GS 58, Nietzsche points out that we can only destroy old beliefs by creating new ones. I interpret this to mean that valuation and truth-seeking are unavoidable, even should we be aware of their constructed nature.



intelligible as such. With the understanding that value judgments influence what is taken to be true, subjectivity becomes a feature of cognition and purely objective truth is unintelligible. In the following passage from *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche points out that his rejection of the thing in itself and discussion of the opposition between subject and object is not the fundamental issue of his critique, as there is no means of arriving at some truth about the world by means of human cognition. His point is that it makes no sense to look for truth that is not grounded in perception and perspective. Whatever might lie outside cognition is unknowable and meaningless.

Nietzsche introduces as well the idea that even our concept of a conscious subject in the world falls under the heading of a value-laden assumption:

“My idea is, as you see, that consciousness does not really belong to man’s individual existence, but rather to his social or herd nature; that, as follows from this, it has developed subtly only insofar as this is required by social or herd utility. [ ] You will guess that it is not the distinction of subject and object that concerns me here: This distinction I leave to the epistemologists who have become entangled in the snares of grammar (the metaphysics of the people). It is even less the opposition of the thing-in-itself and appearance; for we do not “know” nearly enough to be entitled to any such distinction. We simply lack any organ for knowledge, for truth; we “know” (or believe or imagine) just as much as may be *useful* in the interests of the human herd, the species; and even what is here called “utility” is ultimately also a mere belief, something imaginary, and perhaps precisely that most calamitous stupidity of which we shall perish some day.”<sup>24</sup>

Nietzsche is making the claim that what we consider known is just what serves us in the world, but that does not mean that we have some knowledge independent of what we have accepted as true, nor do we have any means for obtaining knowledge that is independent of our needs and mode of understanding. He refers to our knowledge as that which is useful, but we are not to understand that utility, or what is useful to humans is to count as what is true for us. Utility and the assessment of what counts as useful are no more apparent and absolute than the other value judgments we might make.

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<sup>24</sup> GS 354





As we cannot understand knowledge outside our own means of understanding, objectivity takes on a different character in Nietzsche's interpretation than a disinterested observation and report. For Nietzsche, our perspective and our will color the understanding that we have of the world, and we cannot attempt to judge without these operators. He defines objectivity to be

"understood not as 'contemplation without interest', but as *having in our power* our 'pros' and 'cons': so as to be able to engage and disengage them so that we can use the *difference* in perspectives and affective interpretations for knowledge."<sup>25</sup>

We cannot change the ways that we are able to understand things and wishing to do so would negatively impact what understanding we do have, yet we can examine and judge interpretations from within our own cognitive framework, comparing and rejecting in order to develop what is to be knowledge for us. The passage denies that the standard for what is to count as true can be utility, but at the same time, Nietzsche seems to be denying that humans are able to have knowledge at all. One explanation of the apparent discrepancy between the two passages distinguishes two senses for 'knowledge' as characterized by Nietzsche. In the first passage, 'knowledge' refers to knowledge in the sense that we have come to expect from our grammar and metaphysical view, that is, knowledge of independent, fully determined things in themselves. In the second passage, Nietzsche uses 'knowledge' in a limited sense, referring to his assessment of the world as perspectival. In this second sense, knowledge refers to the perspective-based knowledge that is gained by experience in the world and an understanding of what 'objectivity' is to mean for perspectival cognition. Using knowledge in different senses draws out the reliance of language and grammar on our traditional understanding of the meaning of knowledge, as well as determining, in the second passage, what it comes to mean when we are able to see the value-

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<sup>25</sup> GM III, 12



laden character of knowledge and understanding. Nietzsche's point here is that we might understand that truth is value-laden, but what we expect 'truth' and 'knowledge' to imply are programmed into our consciousness and not easily overcome.

Owing to the limitations and character of consciousness, what is known by our mode of cognition is our interpretation of experience to suit our needs in the world, and not necessarily the best presentation of that experience. This point is illustrated in the following passage:

"This is the essence of phenomenalism and perspectivism as I understand them: Owing to the nature of *animal consciousness*, the world of which we can become conscious is only a surface and sign world, a world that is made common and meaner; whatever becomes conscious *becomes* by the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal; all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption."<sup>26</sup>

It is in this passage that Nietzsche refers to perspectivism, the only reference in his published works. Here he claims that the essence of his understanding of the world as perspective and interpretations of it as perspectively located is the general misinterpretation of experience by human consciousness to locate ourselves and our experiences in a world of change and becoming. To clarify this point: the world becomes in the sense that it is never fully determined. It is constantly defined and redefined and as such it cannot be said to 'be' a certain 'way'. What comes before in the interpretation always influences what is to come, but there is no description of the world that gets it *all* 'right'. Cognition is such that it begins with interpretation and judgment and cannot be understood without point of view. All that we can expect of our understanding is a developing collection of descriptions of our experience according to our current needs. Nietzsche describes the nature of our knowledge of the world as our current description of it when he claims the following:

"Explanation" is what we call it, but it is "description" that distinguishes us from older stages of knowledge and science. Our descriptions are better—we do not explain any more than

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<sup>26</sup> GS 354



our predecessors. [ ] But how could we possibly explain anything? We operate only with things that do not exist: lines, planes, bodies, atoms, divisible time spans, divisible spaces. How should explanations be at all possible when we first turn everything into an *image*, our image!"<sup>27</sup>

Our knowledge of the world is a matter of error not in the sense that there is a fixed way the world is, that we cannot hope to be correct about, but that truth cannot be understood in the traditional way. As value is always attached to truth assertions and the formation of concepts, there cannot be direct correspondence between fully determined objects independent of experience and what is experienced. If the subject of experience and the object of experience exist in two separate worlds, there cannot be an immediate apprehension of the object by the subject that does not change the object in some respect, even if that change is from being inexperienced to being experienced.

Our errors about the world are irrefutable because they do not extend beyond their usefulness or value within our interpretation to anything fixed beyond that interpretation, and they are errors in that they are a distortion of experience to suit our needs. When Nietzsche claims, "*Ultimate skepsis*.—What are man's truths ultimately? Merely his *irrefutable* errors,"<sup>28</sup> he cannot be understood as using 'error' to mean 'getting it wrong about things in the world'. Instead, Nietzsche is claiming that we are constantly describing when we make knowledge claims, but our descriptions, based on logical thinking and language, must consider something fixed to be explained in order to develop any understanding at all. His epistemological critique looks to the possibility of ever being able to determine 'right' or 'wrong' descriptions of the world. His point is that interpretation of the world must always start from a particular point or perspective, so that it is impossible to make sense of meaning without this starting point. In the following passage,

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<sup>27</sup> GS 112

<sup>28</sup> GS 265





Nietzsche explains the requirement of interpretation for existence:

“How far the perspective character of existence extends or indeed whether existence has any other character than this; whether existence without interpretation, without “sense” does not become “nonsense”; whether on the other hand all existence is not essentially actively engaged in interpretation—that cannot be decided even by the most industrious and most scrupulously conscientious analysis and self-examination of the intellect; for in the course of this analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives and only in these. We cannot look around our own corner.”<sup>29</sup>

This passage serves to indicate Nietzsche’s dismissal of the possibility of extra-perspectival knowledge, effectively illuminating his view that perspective is the very ground of understanding. It is here that he most clearly states his perspectivism and announces his criticism of epistemological views that seek ‘true’ knowledge of a ‘real’ world not grounded in interpretation from a given position. For Nietzsche, the possibility of extra-perspectival knowledge is simply meaningless. What is known of the world is the result of interpretations followed by and influencing further interpretations, such that what is taken to be true at a given time is informed by previous descriptions of ‘truth’.

Nietzsche’s epistemological critique of knowledge is a criticism of the traditional metaphysical understanding of knowledge as the ability of a subject to know an existent world of objects in itself. Nietzsche rejects the idea that knowledge consists of the correspondence of ideas to extra-perspectival objects, and even questions the distinction made by epistemology between the knowing subject and the known object. As he indicates in GS 354, above, this distinction itself is meaningless in the absence of a perspective that interprets the world as made up of discreet subjects and objects, as our perspective does. This distinction is informed by a particular interpretation from a particular perspective. What is important to Nietzsche in this aspect of his critique is the idea that meaning and value are grounded in life and interpretation.

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<sup>29</sup> GS 374



The interpretations from these perspectives might take as their starting point the interpretive character of the will to power, and the stretching forth of any perspective to interpret the world according to its own needs and values. Nietzsche cannot offer this view as a better understanding of an absolute fact about the world, but within his own formula, he is able to invest more value in his own interpretation than in those prior to it. It can be understood as more useful, more life-affirming, or better adhering to any other assumed value within a perspective.

### **1.3 Ontological Critique of Truth**

The epistemological aspect of Nietzsche's critique of truth sought to point out the absurdity of the possibility of knowledge of truth in itself. The ontological aspect of his critique calls into question the necessity for belief in truth in itself at all, questioning the meaning and value of a world fully constituted in itself and awaiting interpretation. Fundamental to Nietzsche's view of the world is the idea that previous philosophers have forgotten the origins of truth and now seek truth in itself in a 'real' world existing counter to the world of appearance. He rejects the notion that the world of appearance, or becoming, is a world standing in opposition to a world in itself, or a world where things exist as things separated from any knowledge of them or perspective on them. Denying the distinction between a true world and an apparent world as well as rejecting the thing in itself in favor of a world of change and becoming, leaves open the possibility for a number of interpretations of the world, including an interpretation of the world as will to power, where power is projected from different perspectives in an attempt to overcome and absorb other interpretations of the world. Nietzsche's reduction of meaning to only what can be lived in the world brings the creation of value back to the experiential level. Nietzsche's position provides the means for the possibility of understanding by rejecting the thing in itself and seeing cognition as the ground of experience rather than a limitation.



### 1.3.1 Rejection of the thing in itself

Nietzsche's critique of dogmatism questions the concept of an object or world of objects to which our experiences and concepts correspond, which demotes experience to the *merely* apparent and the deceptive. Nietzsche's early critique of truth, as in his unpublished essay *on Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense*, accepts that idea that truth is to be understood as a relationship between ideas and things in themselves. However, as early as *Human all Too Human*, Nietzsche refers to the absurdity of the thing in itself, rejecting the idea that the experience of becoming could be compared to being in itself, awaiting discovery and interpretation. He indicates that understanding the truth relationship as an apprehension of the 'in itself' relies on an empty concept:

"Perhaps we shall realize the thing in itself is worthy of Homeric laughter: that it appeared to be so much, indeed everything, and is actually empty, that is to say, empty of significance."<sup>30</sup>

Nietzsche rules out the primacy of being to becoming, dissolving the dichotomy of a 'true world' in opposition to a merely apparent world of experience, into the way the world comes to be through interpretation and valuation. Descriptions of the world no longer fall into right or wrong, because it is the description itself that gives value to the world. For Nietzsche, positing a thing in itself outside experience denies the primacy of becoming over being, and overlooks the place of interpretation in understanding. The thing in itself is not only impossible to know, it is a concept completely devoid of meaning when knowledge is understood to be perspectival.

Nietzsche's genealogy of truth includes not only the way the social origin of truth is forgotten, but also the way that philosopher's have given being precedence over becoming. The falsification of experience by reason and language extends to adding to the world of change and appearance the idea that something must be constant, effectively denying, or "mummifying" the

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<sup>30</sup> HA 16





experience of becoming in favor of 'being'. As interpretations of sense experience proved to be deceptive, philosophers looked to something beyond sense experience to fill in the subject and object required by language and logical thinking. Nietzsche considers the origin of the falsification of the world and ultimate division of experience into 'real' and 'apparent' in a discussion of knowledge in GS:

"Over immense periods of time the intellect produced nothing but errors. A few of these proved to be useful and helped preserve the species...Such erroneous articles of faith, which were continually inherited, until they became almost part of the basic endowment of the species, include the following: that there are equal things, that there are enduring things, substances, bodies...Indeed even in the realm of knowledge, these propositions became the norms according to which "true" and "untrue" were determined... Thus the strength of knowledge does not depend on the degree of truth, but on its age, in the degree to which it has been incorporated, on its character as a condition of life."<sup>31</sup>

What began, on Nietzsche's explanation, as a means of making possible the existence of the species became the denial of the experiences and ultimate reality of the species in favor of the absolute value of truth and the 'real'. In order to make *being* comprehensible, philosophers determined that the world of experience must be only one of *appearance* and therefore, suspect. However, Nietzsche sees appearance as the only reality as he indicates in the following:

"'Reason' is the cause of our falsification of the evidence of the senses. Insofar as the senses show becoming, passing away, change, they do not lie...But Heraclitus will always be right in this, that being is an empty fiction. The 'apparent' world is the only one: the 'real' world has only been lyingly added."<sup>32</sup>

Thus to turn the becoming of their experience into being, philosophers made becoming into an illusion, a false and merely apparent world. The error in positing the real world beyond the apparent is in conceiving of the notion of an object or world of objects relating to experience, that cannot themselves be experienced, as well as the assumption of the value of such things.

Nietzsche's early works offer an analysis of the impossibility of representing independent

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<sup>31</sup> GS 110

<sup>32</sup> TI Reason, 2



objects in our concepts, but as he begins to develop his views about the value-laden and interpretive nature of human knowledge, he rejects the existence of an independent world altogether. The understanding of the world as becoming and change negates the idea of a fixed object waiting to be discovered by an equally fixed subject. For Nietzsche, the thing in itself is lost with the loss of God and the absolute because there is nothing meaningful to be said about interpretations of objects that are themselves devoid of interpretation. As he states, the thing in itself is an empty concept when truth and the possibility of truth are rejected.

### ***1.3.2 Perspective and the Will to Power***

Nietzsche's critique of knowledge of the thing in itself and real world, and his eventual rejection of the two, point to his collapse of the distinction between being and becoming into the idea of the world as becoming, which contains 'being' as a concept and his assertion that the world is a collection of perspectives on that becoming and the power exercised by those perspectives. By rejecting the thing in itself and calling into question the project of truth-seeking, Nietzsche is able to put forth his own values as a counter-interpretation.

Nietzsche interprets the world in terms of the exercise of force and inconsistent change. He sees the human concept of the world as fixed and orderly as a result of our looking for traits in the world that fit into our language of subject and object. For Nietzsche, the character that we believe the world to have is largely contributed by our own means of understanding the character of human knowledge itself. Looking to find ourselves within the world, we make it over in our own image, imposing ourselves on our interpretations of experience. However, as Nietzsche explains, the meaning we find in the world is made in the search for meaning:

"there is no presuppositionless knowledge, the thought of such a thing is unthinkable, paralogical: a philosophy, a 'faith' always has to be there first, for knowledge to win from it a direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, a *right* to exist. (Whoever understands it the other



way around and, for example, tries to place philosophy on a strictly scientific foundation', first needs to *stand not only philosophy on its head* but truth itself as well: the worst offence against decency which can occur in relation to two such respectable ladies!)"<sup>33</sup>

In making over the world in our image, we also revise what truth meant to understanding initially, and reinvent the concept of truth as outside and beyond experience itself. For Nietzsche order and law in the world is just one interpretation, and an interpretation that takes its character from the values of the human knowers. As he explains, what we see in the world is a reflection of ourselves:

"The total character of the world, however, is in all eternity, chaos—in the sense not of a lack of necessity, but of a lack order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms..."<sup>34</sup>

The world however, has the possibility of many such interpretations. This is a possibility not only by the existence of different types of knowers, but also in the indeterminacy of the world of becoming. For Nietzsche, accepting that what we count as truth cannot be directly related to a real world makes it such that:

"The world has become "infinite" for us all over again, inasmuch as we cannot reject the possibility that *it may include infinite interpretations*..."<sup>35</sup>

The possibility of interpretation is infinite from within the finitude of our means of understanding. We are not limited by our capacity, as it is our finite capacity that makes knowledge possible at all. Interpretation and assertion of value are what allow us to begin *creating* value in a world where there is no meaning waiting to be *found*.

The distinction between real and apparent can no longer hold any significance for Nietzsche once we have understood that the real world is something added to experience in order to make sense of it, but which names nothing. All we can understand the world to be is that

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<sup>33</sup> GM III,24, see also, BGE Preface

<sup>34</sup> GS 109, see also GS 110, 111

<sup>35</sup> GS 374





which we experience, understood in the ways that we understand it. Concerning the opposition of appearance to essence, he exclaims,

“What is “appearance” for me now? Certainly not the opposite of some essence: what could I say about any essence except to name the attributes of its appearance! Certainly not a dead mask that one could place on an unknown x or remove from it!”<sup>36</sup>

Understanding the world as appearance and reality, or appearance and essence initially served to make sense of opposite values, but with the understanding that such values come from the human mode of cognition, it is no longer useful to see the world as made up of fundamental oppositions. All the world can be understood to contain are perhaps infinite perspectives expressing a different understanding of the world. We can build up concepts of things from within a perspective, but concepts and objects are only known and understood from within a perspective, and as Nietzsche explains, relative to the will and emotion driving interpretation:

“There is *only* a perspective seeing, *only* a perspective ‘knowing’; the *more* affects we allow to speak about a thing, the *more* eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ of the thing, our objectivity. But to eliminate the will completely and turn off all the emotions without exception, assuming we could; well? would that not mean to *castrate* the intellect?...”<sup>37</sup>

Our own understanding expects opposition, but does not find it in experience. Like the opposition of being and becoming, appearance and essence cannot be set apart from and opposed to one another. Essence can only be understood in terms of experience, and without appearance, reality is meaningless. As Nietzsche explains,

“We should admit at least this much: there would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspectivist assessments and appearances; and if only one wanted to do away with the ‘apparent world’ entirely, as some valiantly enthusiastic and foolish philosophers want to do, well then, assuming that people like *you* could do that—then at the very least there would be nothing left of your ‘truth’, either!”<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> GS 54

<sup>37</sup> GM III, 12

<sup>38</sup> BGE 34



Without a real world to which our assessments correspond, these perspectives cannot be understood to be perspectives of some 'thing', or differing views of some determined object. Instead, the difference of perspective is all that makes up the world. Without a given, one might attempt to offer an interpretation that better serves the values of the perspective than a current interpretation.

Because it is not possible to make an assertion without beginning with an assumption of values, a critique of a current interpretation can only replace it, not tear it down to leave nothing in its place<sup>39</sup>. Nietzsche offers as an alternative to dogmatism his notion of the world as will to power, or the expression of power from each perspective attempting to impose itself on others. He refers to this idea in the following passage from *Beyond Good and Evil*:

"Assuming that nothing real is 'given' to us apart from our world of desires and passions, assuming that we cannot ascend or descend to any 'reality' other than the reality of our instincts, may we not be allowed to perform an experiment and ask whether this 'given' also provides a *sufficient* explanation for the so-called mechanistic world?"<sup>40</sup>

The will to power is offered experimentally initially, but addressed more fully in a work from the very next year in a discussion of the relationship of power and domination to meaning and existence:

"Anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it; that everything that occurs in the organic world consists of *overpowering, dominating*, and in their turn, overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former meaning and purpose must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated." <sup>41</sup>

In this passage, Nietzsche relates the meaning of objects to the interpretive nature of understanding and expresses his view that the world of our experience contains just this

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<sup>39</sup> See GS 58

<sup>40</sup> BGE 36, see also BGE 22

<sup>41</sup> GM II, 12



dominating and interpretive drive. The expression of the will to power as the basis of the world cannot be separated from the critique of the thing in itself and Nietzsche's assessment of the world as in a state of process.

The rejection of an object to be known calls into question the nature of the knowing subject and what it is that this subject can know. Nietzsche dismisses human knowledge as erroneous and false, as well as considering that consciousness itself might be one more aspect of the needs of the human species for survival. His rejection of the thing in itself and an absolute world of extra-perspectival objects leads to his assertion that all is perspectival, and that perspective is an inescapable aspect of understanding. Nietzsche criticizes the view that we can have knowledge of an independently existing world of objects, which can be apprehended by us as determined knowers, however, he re-interprets the meaning of knowledge following this critique such that knowledge on these new terms can be understood to mean an interpretation within a perspective. The error in human knowledge is in understanding knowledge as a correspondence to the rejected thing in itself by a subject separated from the world of becoming. Understanding the character of our understanding, we can have knowledge of the world, but knowledge in the second sense of what can be known within a given perspective and interpretation.

Nietzsche's objective with his critique of truth is to call into the question the idea that truth exists in the world independently of the interpretation and perspective characteristic of cognition. He offers both a genealogical account of truth and a discussion of the will to power to cast doubt on both the possibility and the value metaphysical truth has to practical inquiry. His critique of truth takes as a starting point the psychological need for truth and reasons to the meaninglessness of searching for truth and the existence of truth in itself in the absence of an





absolute. Instead, he offers, truth is a matter of interpretation within a given perspective and the way such interpretations develop over time is a function of the interpretation itself. The difficulty with his account lies in his denying the possibility of a standard for the comparison of perspectives while offering perspectivism as the basis for interpretation. Discussions of Nietzsche's perspectivism such as that of Maudemarie Clark focus on the consistency of his statement of perspectivism in the face of his critique without making adequate consideration of the psychological aspect of his critique. Nietzsche himself announces that epistemological and ontological concerns are only secondary to his critique, and as such, a discussion of Nietzsche's critique of truth must consider his critique of the will to truth as primary. In the next chapter, I will consider two standard solutions to the self-reference of perspectivism, those of Arthur Danto and Alexander Nehamas, and the influence these have had on the solution set forth by Maudemarie Clark. It is my contention that Clark's account of Nietzsche's rejection of truth successfully depicts his rejection of the thing in itself, but that her objective of finding a solution to the apparent inconsistencies in the epistemological and ontological aspects of the critique lead her to overlook the importance of his psychological critique.



## Chapter Two: The Influence of Danto and Nehamas on Clark

The problem that interpreters such as, Danto and Nehamas, face is that Nietzsche's critique of truth calls into question the possibility, existence, and value of truth in itself, yet makes claims about the character of understanding in general and the falsity of human understanding in particular that imply a truth about the nature of the world. These assertions are exemplified by the following passages:

'This is the essence of phenomenalism and perspectivism as I understand them: Owing to the nature of *animal consciousness* the world of which we can become conscious is only a surface and sign-world, a world that is made common and meaner; whatever becomes conscious *becomes* by the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal; all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities and generalization...' <sup>42</sup>

and

'Of course in order to speak as he did about the spirit and the good, Plato had to set truth on its head and deny perspectivity, that fundamental condition of all life...' <sup>43</sup>

Comparing the above passages to his critique, it would seem that Nietzsche calls into question truth in itself, yet accepts truth in some sense. The issue to be resolved for Nietzsche's account is the relationship between his critique of truth and his positive account of perspective. I believe that the two not need necessarily be made consistent, as his primary concern is with a critique of the will to truth. His ontological and epistemological claims are meant to call into question the value of truth, over and above asserting a Nietzschean theory of truth. Professor Clark, on the other hand, sees the need to make Nietzsche's epistemological and ontological claims consistent with his critique as primary.

Standard accounts of Nietzsche's critique of truth understand the problem facing perspectivism to be the standard by which perspectives are to be judged if there can be no 'truth'

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<sup>42</sup> GS 354

<sup>43</sup> BGE Prologue



of the matter useful for comparing perspectives. Perspectivism contains the idea that there is no objectively true description of the world existing independent of an interpretive perspective. As such, the truth of perspectivism is not something that can be affirmed objectively. In offering perspectivism and a world of becoming as an alternative to a dogmatic, metaphysical approach, Nietzsche seems to replace the view that there is only one correct or true representation of the world with the view that there exists the possibility of a wide variety of interpretations of experience, none of which offer a single best explanation of the world and 'truth in itself' is no longer the criterion for discriminating. Nietzsche considers this possibility in the following passage:

'But I should think that today we are at least far from the ridiculous immodesty that would be involved in decreeing from our corner that perspectives are permitted only from this corner. Rather has the world become "infinite" for us all over again, inasmuch as we cannot reject the possibility that it may include infinite interpretations...' <sup>44</sup>

If Nietzsche is understood as having *rejected* both the possibility of discovering truth and the very existence of truth in itself with his critique of truth, he cannot, without contradiction, offer perspectivism as an objective and discoverable feature of the world. However, if Nietzsche allows that perspectivism is one interpretation of experience among others, without a standard for judging between interpretations, perspectivism seems to have no greater claim to justification than any other view and no means for promoting itself as a better description of the world. Nietzsche's claim in the above passage points to perspectivism as the necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge and indicates the impossibility of transcending perspective to make such a comparison. The response to this apparent contradiction offered by both Arthur Danto and Alexander Nehamas is to show that Nietzsche's critique amounts to a rejection of the

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<sup>44</sup> GS 374



correspondence theory of truth and foundationalism, but that perspectivism is intended by Nietzsche to be compatible with this.

The analysis offered by Maudemarie Clark is largely influenced by the interpretations of both Arthur Danto and Alexander Nehamas. In both cases, their influence comes out in her inquiry through the distinctions that she makes and directions that she takes with her analysis. It is my belief that a discussion of both Danto and Nehamas and Clark's responses to them set the stage for her solution to the self-referential nature of perspectivism, which will be discussed in Chapter Three. The focus of this chapter is therefore, the solutions that Danto and Nehamas offer to the 'self-reference problem' and the way those solutions are taken up by Clark in preparation of her own account.

## **2.1 Danto on Perspectivism and Self-reference**

For Arthur Danto, the defining characteristic of Nietzsche's philosophy is Nietzsche's own version of nihilism. On Danto's account, Nietzsche's nihilism is a rejection that life has a determined meaning in itself to be apprehended through experience and reason. Danto describes this nihilism as a hyperbolic rejection of the correspondence theory of truth. Danto argues that Nietzsche rejected an objective order of the world and struggled to bring philosophical inquiry back to what has practical import for life. For Danto, Nietzsche does not view the importance of philosophy in the traditional sense of working out solutions to ontological and epistemological questions; he is instead concerned with overcoming the search for truth in itself. Nietzsche's genealogical account of truth is an attempt to look into the origins of these problems as a means to resolving them. For Danto then, Nietzsche's critique of the *value* of truth itself, and the motivations for seeking it, are of primary importance.





Danto understands Nietzsche to be arguing that the human understanding of a world of experience, with natural laws, individuals, and objects is a mode of consciousness that shapes the reality of the world for knowers such as we are. Danto refers to the way the world appears as 'common sense' and explains that this is a product of cognition that serves to define understanding. This understanding is itself an interpretation, with no correspondence with an objective fact about the world. The truth of common sense, on this account, is that although it is not 'true' in a correspondence sense, it is true in the pragmatic sense of facilitating and furthering the sort of life reliant on this particular perspective. In relationship to common sense, other perspectives are 'false' in that they do not present the conditions by which our sort of being understands the world.

In order to elucidate Nietzsche's use of 'truth' and 'falsity', Danto explains that these are to be understood in a traditional, metaphysical, or 'wide,' sense and a perspectival 'narrow' sense. The wide sense of 'true' is what is commonly understood as the correspondence between belief and some fact about the world. Nietzsche's critique of truth calls this understanding of truth into question and Danto understands Nietzsche to reject this notion of truth altogether. 'True' for Nietzsche, Danto explains, is in the narrow sense of what is true within a perspective, or within one particular mode of interpretation. Nietzsche's nihilism is thereby a metaphysical proposition, understood as true in the narrow sense. For Danto, Nietzsche's nihilism amounts to a positive ascription of knowledge within an interpretive framework, rather than a limitation based on the interpretive character of knowledge. In other words, Danto interprets Nietzsche's point to be that our means and mode of understanding, that is, our perspective, do not limit our apprehension of an objective world order, but rather make it possible for any interpretation at all. Nietzsche's rejection of an objective world order makes it possible for him to offer a narrow conception of truth



as what is true on our particular interpretation. On this account, Nietzsche's nihilism is not the inability of humans to apprehend some meaning in the world, but the affirmation that truth is a function of interpretation according to the mode of cognition best suited for human flourishing.

While Danto does not explicitly refer to his rendering of perspectivism as a visual metaphor, he does believe that Nietzsche intends perspectivism to indicate that we cannot see things except through a perspective. He sees this as potentially misleading, as it implies that there exists an independent thing to be 'seen'. However, on his view, there is nothing meaningful to be said about anything independent of the view of it from a perspective.

The force of Danto's definition of truth as what is true within the parameters of interpretation lies in his understanding of 'perspective' as wider than the idiosyncratic viewpoints of individuals. Danto sees Nietzsche's criterion of truth to be common to all beings with the understanding of the world as a collection of objects interacting according to natural laws. This interpretation avoids that obvious challenge that interpretations must be grounded by transcendent truth by seeing the understanding of objects and correspondence to be a *feature* of interpretation and our particular perspective. When Danto writes of a standard of truth as a pragmatic issue, he is not saying that certain interpretations might serve life in various ways, he is pointing out the origin of interpretation itself as understood by Nietzsche as the way in which life has flourished in the past and come to be now. The interpretation of the world as objects and laws is the best interpretation because it has worked and continues to inform experience, not because it can be or has been weighed against competing alternatives derived from descriptions of true being.

Danto's solution to the self-referential nature of perspectivism therefore results from his distinguishing Nietzsche's use of 'truth' into wide and narrow senses. Perspectivism is true as a



feature or our cognitive framework, but false as an objective (wide) description of the world in itself. In its simplest form, Danto characterizes the pragmatic theory of truth as, “P is true and Q is false if P works and Q doesn’t.”<sup>45</sup> Danto understands Nietzsche to be rejecting not only the possibility of apprehending truth in itself, but its very existence. Danto explains that, for Nietzsche, distinctions such as ‘true and false’ or, ‘good and evil’, have no application to an objective reality. Such concepts are features of our perspective and serve our understanding of the world and particular use of language. What is important to Nietzsche, on Danto’s view, is that we overcome the idea that there is some objective structure of the world, existing prior to our interpretation or conception of it. When opposites such as ‘true’ and ‘false’ are assigned to interpretations of experience, these designations cannot be understood as corresponding to objects in the world, and thereby better or worse descriptions of objects.

According to Danto, the key problem that Nietzsche finds with metaphysical representations of truth (in the wide sense) is in understanding the world as necessarily composed of objects apprehended by human subjects; a view that is already itself interpretive and perspectival. In such views, a world of objects is regarded as commonsensical, and presupposed in all inquiry because such an understanding is required by our mode of cognition. Danto sees Nietzsche criticizing the presupposition that our common sense is ‘true’ on the grounds that it assumes an objective description of the world, overlooking the origin and evolution of this way of interpreting experience. Danto contends that, for Nietzsche, understanding the world as a collection of objects is the condition of our understanding of the world, created by us, rather than a discovery or apprehension of true being. Common sense is thus erroneously

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<sup>45</sup> 1965, 72





contrasted to other interpretations of the world by not questioning its role as the objective standard for interpretation and not being included among interpretations.

Understanding common sense to itself be interpretation, beliefs are only to be considered true in relationship to other interpretations and on Danto's account, Nietzsche holds that it would be a mistake to see beliefs as true in the sense of expressing some fact about the world independently of the interests of life and survival of those expressing the belief. There is no fact of the world outside perspectives, and it is a mistake to understand perspectivism as offering the view that the true world would be found in the sum of various perspectival interpretations of experience. Danto explicates the 'falsification thesis', or the idea that all of our ideas are false, by explaining that our ideas are all false in the sense that there is no order in the world for our views to be 'true' about. Danto explains that according to Nietzsche's account, our views have nothing to which they correspond, as there is nothing to stand on the other end of a correspondence relationship to our beliefs.

Danto interprets Nietzsche's perspectivism as the view that rival interpretations are not better or worse understandings of the world, but contrasting ways of understanding the world. As perspectivism requires that there be only interpretations in the world, rejecting positive facts, we can say nothing meaningful about what perspectives could be perspectives of. Again, Danto articulates, as there are no objects and no substances independent of our interpretive reality, we cannot expect our interpretations to be of individuated objects existing distinct from interpretation. What we come to think of as true is only the prevailing interpretation. On this view, science and what we consider scientific discovery are a matter of reworking our beliefs to make them more useful and therefore, necessary to humans and their survival.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> 1965, 72-78



Danto's approach to the self-reference of perspectivism is to propose that Nietzsche's view is a rejection of correspondence in favor of a pragmatic view of truth, in which what is true is best understood by what best serves the survival of the species. Without an objective world order, that is, without a meaning in the world beyond the meaning created within the world, truth can only be determined to be that which better enables the activity of interpretation, or best ensures the continuance of the interpreter. For Danto, Nietzsche is able to critique dogmatic metaphysics while offering his own account of the world, as he has already rejected a 'true' nature of the world to which interpretations might correspond, and as such, the only way to understand Nietzsche's insistence on perspective is as the understanding of the world that best fulfills the practical needs of human interpreters. Nietzsche's view is thus a 'narrow' metaphysical view in offering an interpretation of the world as perspective, while critiquing 'wide' metaphysical views that seek a single, correct, explanation of the world and experience. What best fulfills this is a life-affirming, pragmatic theory of perspectivism, in which all meaning is developed from within life and living in the world, as opposed to existing apart from and set up against life and perspective.

## **2.2 Nehamas on Perspective and Self-reference**

Unlike Arthur Danto, Alexander Nehamas sees contradiction in Nietzsche's view, but argues, similarly to Clark, that this is not ultimately self-defeating. Like Danto, Nehamas sees the question of the value of truth as primary, yet Nehamas rejects Danto's pragmatic criterion of truth, on the grounds that Nietzsche's critique of truth is not a simple rejection of the correspondence theory of truth. He argues as well that Nietzsche explicitly rejects utility as the criterion of truth in such passages as:



'Something might be true while being harmful and dangerous to the highest degree. Indeed, it may be a basic characteristic of existence that those who would know it completely would perish, in which case the strength of a spirit should be measured according to how much of the 'truth' one could still barely endure—or to put it more clearly, to what degree one would *require* it to be thinned down, sweetened, falsified."<sup>47</sup>

Nehamas argues that the pragmatic criterion as explicated by Danto seems only to reassert the correspondence theory by insisting on the possibility of truth and falsity, albeit understood according to a different criterion. Nehamas finds the replacement of the criterion of correspondence with that of utility to be unsupported by Nietzsche's critique of truth and he denies that Nietzsche can be understood to offer any positive account of truth to replace the correspondence that he rejects with his critique. For Nehamas, 'truth' and 'falsity' are terms which refer to some state of affairs completely independent of interpretation, and are not to be used in a relational sense, as Danto suggests. Nehamas' interpretation of perspectivism relies on rejecting the idea that Nietzsche offers a new criterion of truth. Instead, Nehamas argues, Nietzsche's point is that interpretation of truth and falsity is entirely context dependent, and no single, transcendent criterion of truth is possible. Instead, truth is dependent on the interpretations of particular lives lived for particular reasons.

Nehamas argues that perspectivism is an expression of Nietzsche's desire to deny that the world contains any features in itself, independent of interpretation. Nehamas understands Nietzsche's view to be that there is no way the world is 'in itself' for us to misapprehend with our interpretations. As such, the idea of interpretations being limited presentations of the world in itself, and therefore a false representation of the world, is nonsensical. Nehamas contends that Nietzsche is concerned to show that simplification and falsification are used by Nietzsche as the ways in which beings are able to arrange reality according to their own needs, and open up the

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<sup>47</sup> BGE 39





possibility for further interpretation.

Nehamas understands perspectivism to necessarily require a process of selectivity and simplification as a means to interpretation. By understanding perspective as a necessary requirement for knowledge, we cannot expect to gain all possible information about an experience. To do so would eliminate the perspectival and relational aspect of cognition and the very possibility of knowledge. Nehamas explains that by seeking a neutral viewpoint, we are looking for a shared standard and ultimately offering one perspective as the best interpretation. He denies that perspectives describe selected features of a stable object, offering instead that Nietzsche understands objects to be just how they are presented in an interpretation. To draw out this point, Nehamas uses an example of a painting viewed from close up and from further away. At different intervals, it appears different ways. No one way of interpreting the painting offers the 'best' understanding of it, and the complete sum of views offers no account at all, once the differing interpretations come into conflict. How the painting *is* depends on the way it is conceived according to a given interpretation. Nehamas' point with this example is that the painting has no unifying features in itself, distinguished from the features it has according to each view of it. Likewise, according to perspectivism, there is no world of objects to be apprehended other than what is constituted in and through interpretation. We cannot understand the various points of view as relating to one definite object, for which, if we combined all perspectives, we might be able to create a complete picture of that object. Instead, each interpretation of the world is the totality of the world as experienced. Like Danto, Nehamas rejects the idea that if one were to collect all interpretations together, the world in itself might be presented. Perspectives are not perspectives *on* something, on Nehamas' account but selection of the meaning of the world according to values, interests, and goals.





Nehamas' point about selection and simplification serves his analysis of perspective to indicate that incompleteness is necessary for any interpretation. He contends that one cannot offer a standard for comparing perspectives without a complete description of what is being interpreted, a possibility that Nehamas rules out. On his view, interpretation fosters further interpretation, but is not a means for discovering some fact in itself. Nehamas takes Nietzsche's claim above on the possibility of an infinity of interpretations to indicate that it would make no sense to speak of a complete or final interpretation. Nehamas understands Nietzsche's point to be that there is not *one* interpretation of the world, but that the world is finite and interpretable. Interpretation refers to the constant shift of value and selection as we choose and promote types of lives and values.

Nehamas' challenge to the self-reference problem is to argue that only that actual falsity of perspectivism gives the proper grounds for rejecting it. On his view, merely opening the possibility that some views are not interpretations is not an adequate argument against perspectivism. 'Truth' and 'falsity' are only relevant according to some context, and Nietzsche's presentation of perspectivism takes place from his own perspective. For Nehamas, Nietzsche's view presents a contradiction between offering a critique and a positive view, but Nietzsche's writing style is illustrative of the interpretive message that Nietzsche is attempting to convey. Nehamas contends that rather than offering a theory of knowledge with his perspectivism, Nietzsche is asserting that all efforts to know are relative to living in the world, and that his presentation of his own view is the application of perspectivism to himself.<sup>48</sup> Nehamas sees Nietzsche's presentation of his ideas in a variety of literary styles as pointing out a connection between Nietzsche's aestheticism and his perspectivism. For Nehamas, this connection shows

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<sup>48</sup> 1985, 73



Nietzsche's attempt to create a literary figure of himself, which allows his audience to perceive his positive views as the particular views of one, distinct individual, rather than a dogmatic presentation of unconditional authority. Nehamas explains that Nietzsche viewed the world as an art or literary work, and like a work of art, the world would have interpretability as a feature, yet could not be understood to include a neutral standard by which interpretations could be considered right or wrong.<sup>49</sup>

Nehamas identifies a mixture of literary style in Nietzsche's works, including metaphor and the scholarly treatise, as well as the aphoristic style focused on by Kaufmann. Nehamas sees the unifying feature in each style to be Nietzsche's use of hyperbole, but that the differences between the styles serve to draw out an analogy between the possibilities of artistic style and the possibilities of perspective, as well as to distinguish Nietzsche's approach to philosophy from the philosophical tradition. With this, Nehamas rejects Kaufmann's interpretation that Nietzsche was searching for an adequate means of expression, citing a passage from Nietzsche's notebooks where he claims,

"We cannot change our means of expression at will: it is possible to understand to what extent they are mere signs. The demand for an adequate mode of expression is senseless: it is of the essence of a language, a means of expression, to express a mere relationship---"<sup>50</sup>

From this, it is clear to Nehamas that Nietzsche's varied style served as one element in his perspectivism, rather than an attempt to make his views understood in the face of his critique of the influence of grammar and language on our beliefs about the world. On the contrary, Nehamas argues, Nietzsche's presentation is an effort to offer his own views without insisting on them categorically. His particular use of hyperbole is intended to attract his audience and shake

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<sup>49</sup> 1985, Introduction, 3-9

<sup>50</sup> WTP 625



them out of indifference.<sup>51</sup>

Nehamas sees Nietzsche's attack on truth as a critique of the conditions under which certain views are held true. For his own part, Nietzsche doesn't see it as wrong to accept one's own beliefs as true. The problem arises from the attempt to proclaim one's beliefs to be true *universally*.<sup>52</sup> Nehamas holds that Nietzsche himself does not wish to be believed universally, instead he is seeking a specific audience for his personal views of the world. Nehamas explains that Nietzsche sees dogmatism and 'metaphysics' as self-deceptive attempts to project personal values and views onto the world, and is attempting to avoid the same mistake. By presenting his own views as interpretations, Nietzsche can avoid the problem of presenting a view concurrently with his critique.<sup>53</sup> His changing styles make him unforgettable as the writer, Nehamas reasons, making Nietzsche's presence as presenter and interpreter distinct within his works.<sup>54</sup>

Nehamas further indicates that Nietzsche's rejection of metaphysics and truth-seeking in BGE is followed by his assertions in GS and GM that questioning the value of truth does not mean that one is able to thereby give up the project of truth-seeking altogether. Nehamas sees perspectivism as Nietzsche's attempt to move away from any view of the world as possessing any principles or features prior to or independent of interpretation, yet acknowledging that the making of assertions cannot be halted by simply questioning the value of truth. Although not explicit in Nehamas' interpretation, I see this as a connection between perspectivism and the psychological critique of truth. I agree with Nehamas' point here that truth-seeking is the issue that Nietzsche is concerned with and that even an analysis like Clark's takes 'truth' to be focus rather than the 'will to truth' because the quest for truth is fundamental to our particular mode of

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<sup>51</sup> 1985, 19-27

<sup>52</sup> To support this, Nehamas cites BGE 43.

<sup>53</sup> To support this, Nehamas cites BGE 22.

<sup>54</sup> 1985, 33-34





understanding.

Nehamas further points out that, without absolute features, there seems to be no basis for determining that the world has been interpreted rightly or wrongly. What is to count as reality is not something behind appearance, but the totality of interpretations of the world, that is, the complete set of ways the world appears to any interpreting being. Perspectivism is thus not an indication of some absolute feature about the world, but an assertion about a possible interpretation of it made by a particular creature living within the world and interpreting it, in this case, Nietzsche himself. Nietzsche's own view of the world is one of a finite number of interpretations by experiencing beings in the world, each of these beings determined by its interpretation of experience. Nehamas contends that as there is no separate point of view relating to a correct understanding of the world, to which a given interpretation might correspond, this view is distinct from relativism. As Nietzsche rejects the possibility of independently existing things, only interpretations make up the world. Perspectivism can thus only be considered self-refuting if we can produce an understanding of the world in which interpretation plays no essential role, and which is not itself an interpretation.<sup>55</sup>

To make the distinction between relativism and perspectivism more explicit, Nehamas seeks to show a connection between what Nietzsche refers to as the 'falsification' of the world and our simplification of experience. This falsification is necessary to interpreting creatures as a means to activity and inquiry. Such inquiry requires a degree of selectivity in which we assign importance to some experience, while ignoring or demoting others. There is no possibility of gaining all perspectives and it is the nature of inquiry that some questions remain unasked. Engagement in inquiry presupposes having one perspective to the exclusion of others, but does

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<sup>55</sup> 1985, 67



not imply that one is incorrect or failing to be properly objective. As Nehamas points out in his discussion of self-reference, the possibility that other views exist does not make them actually legitimate interpretations.<sup>56</sup>

Nehamas switches the focus of perspective from the object to the subject, claiming that perspective is not a particular view of an object, but the way the world seems from a perspective. Nietzsche understands knowledge to have a conditional relation to its object. Simplification does not then imply that one only knows an appearance in contrast to a determined object beyond the appearance. The connection between simplification and falsification appears when we believe that we are not forming our beliefs through simplification and interpretation. Nehamas judges that falsification, on Nietzsche's account, occurs when we believe that our interpretation of the world is the only possible correct interpretation. As falsification is not the falsification of an extra-perspectival world through simplification, but the falsification of our own beliefs, falsification cannot be understood as a direct result of that simplification. Nehamas understands Nietzsche's use of 'interpretation' as a means of pointing out the character of our beliefs as value-laden and personally motivated. Forgetting this character of our belief, Nehamas warns, leads to the falsification referred to by Nietzsche.<sup>57</sup>

### **2.3 The influence of Danto and Nehamas on Maudemarie Clark**

For Clark, the problem of self-reference in perspectivism is linked to Nietzsche's claim that human knowledge involves falsification, which implies both a 'truth in itself' to be falsified, and knowledge of both that truth and the falsification. Clark believes the solution offered by Danto represents the standard interpretation of Nietzsche's perspectivism, while that of Nehamas

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<sup>56</sup> 1985, 44-49

<sup>57</sup> 1985, 56-64



offers a more radical approach<sup>58</sup>. In both cases, she argues that their interpretations imply that Nietzsche proclaims the falsity of human belief, or what she terms, 'the falsification thesis'. Clark uses the term 'falsification thesis' to refer to Nietzsche's explicit point in TL that the character of human knowledge distorts reality and that what we take to be truths are mere illusion. Clark takes Nietzsche's acceptance of the falsification thesis to be the key contradiction of perspectivism, when compared to his rejection of the thing in itself. It is her intent to show that Nietzsche rejects the idea that human knowledge falsifies reality in his later works. Clark divides the approaches to the self-reference problem into two distinct strategies for combating the contradiction between the critique of truth and perspectivism. The first of these is to show that the contradiction is merely apparent, and the second to concede the contradiction, but to offer that it is a deliberate attempt by Nietzsche to question the character of knowledge and teach something about truth by means of the contradiction<sup>59</sup>.

Clark's resolution to the problem seeks to combine these two approaches by attempting to resolve both the issue of the truth of perspectivism and the question of the distorting character of understanding. Her concern is to show that the solutions to the self-reference problem as presented by Danto and Nehamas do not adequately consider the inconsistency of Nietzsche's rejection of the thing in itself and the falsification thesis<sup>60</sup>. Her own account takes Danto's interpretation as its starting point, using his distinctions between theories of truth and the question of the commensurability of perspectives to inform the thesis that she will defend. She rejects the conclusions that Danto draws, favoring instead the solutions of set out by Nehamas, including his depiction of the metaphor of perspective and critique of Danto's pragmatic approach. For both,

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<sup>58</sup> 1990, 31

<sup>59</sup> 1990, 1-4

<sup>60</sup> 1990, 21-4



Clark offers criticisms of their accounts that lead to the formulation of her view to be discussed in Chapter Three.

Clarks' concern with the self-referential nature of perspectivism is not with perspectivism as it refers to itself, but with the self-referential nature of Nietzsche's denial of the possibility of human knowledge. In her own account Clark separates Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics, what I have termed his 'ontological critique of truth,' from the falsification thesis, or 'the epistemological critique of truth'. From this, Clark seeks to show that Nietzsche must reject the falsification thesis in order to avoid the conclusion that all human knowledge is false, as well as to reject the thing in itself<sup>61</sup>.

Clark agrees with Danto's assessment that Nietzsche rejects a traditional correspondence theory of truth however, she argues that the pragmatic theory of truth that Danto attributes to Nietzsche is an indefensible view when compared to both the meaning of truth and assertions made by Nietzsche that knowledge of the truth could conflict with the satisfaction of practical interests. For Clark, the pragmatic theory that Danto describes conflicts with passages such GS 121 and 344, as well as BGE 11, where Nietzsche indicates that life itself is no argument for the truth of our belief in objects, and that deception is not necessarily more harmful than 'truth'. She argues that Danto's attempts to deal with such passages only serve to indicate that the pragmatic criteria of truth, as Danto describes it, is incompatible with the common understanding of truth as a statement of what is the case<sup>62</sup>. Clark explains,

'According to the pragmatic theory Danto attributes to Nietzsche, truth is what works, in the sense of what satisfies practical interests such as happiness or survival. But why couldn't a false belief make us happier than a true one? Nietzsche, in fact, insisted repeatedly that knowledge of the truth may conflict with the satisfaction of practical interests (e.g., GS 121, 344; BG 11). Danto interprets such passages as awkward

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<sup>61</sup> 1990, 127-129

<sup>62</sup> 1990 31-4





attempts to reject the correspondence theory in favor of the pragmatic, to say that true beliefs need not correspond to what is the case. But since this apparently means 'God exists' might be true, even if God does not exist, the position Danto attributes to Nietzsche would violate the principle that expresses our surest intuition regarding truth, namely, the equivalence principle, derived from Tarski's convention T (the requirement that an adequate definition of truth entail all sentences of the following form): sentence S is true in language L iff S."<sup>63</sup>

Clark explains that the equivalence principle allows the statement of the conditions under which a sentence of any language is considered true to be possible by removing the quotation marks.

This means, for example, that the statement 'God exists' can only be true, according to the equivalence principle if and only if God does in fact exist. To deny this, she reasons, is to redefine truth in such a way that it no longer has any meaning. Clark believes that by denying that truth means 'true of something' or 'true if something holds' Danto erroneously redefines the meaning of truth. She sees his arguments concerning GS 121, 344 and BGE 11 to admit to the existence of a true world, but a true world that cannot be known or meaningfully described. Ultimately, for Clark only the equivalence principle determines what is meant by 'true' and not pragmatic considerations, as Danto proposes.<sup>64</sup>

Clark sees Danto's distinction between theories of truth to be a useful in its determination that Nietzsche rejects a version of truth, but does not reject the idea of truth in itself. Like Danto, Clark argues that correspondence in some sense was unacceptable to Nietzsche, as such truth requires correspondence to a thing determinately constituted independently of human understanding. However, Clark believes that Nietzsche could accept that metaphysical truth is not to be confounded with practical truth without accepting Danto's pragmatic criterion. Clark agrees with Danto that Nietzsche's perspectivism amounts to a rejection of the correspondence theory of truth, but argues that the proper distinction to be made between theories of truth is to be

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<sup>63</sup> 1990, 32

<sup>64</sup> 1990 32-4



made within the correspondence theory itself. Clark argues that Nietzsche rejects correspondence only in the metaphysical sense, or the idea that truth corresponds to things (or a thing) determinately constituted independently of understanding. It is a rejection of this *metaphysical* correspondence theory of truth that Clark links to Nietzsche's rejection of things in themselves.<sup>65</sup>

Clark argues that Danto's assessment of Nietzsche's rejection of the thing in itself leads him to believe that perspectives are necessarily incommensurable. Clark sees Danto's account of the metaphor of perspective to lead from the idea that the thing in itself would serve as the standard for the comparison between perspectives to the conclusion that should Nietzsche reject the thing in itself, there would be no way at all to compare perspectives, resulting in multiple perspectives that are cognitively equivalent.<sup>66</sup> Counter to this, Clark argues that the thing in itself is not necessary to provide a neutral standard for judgment. She explains that foundationalism is not necessary when any two perspectives can be compared in terms of a third, more neutral perspective. She believes that upon comparison, one of the two competing perspectives could be seen to exhibit a higher satisfaction of the shared cognitive interests between the two perspectives under comparison. She disagrees with Danto's conclusion that without the thing in itself, there is no possibility of a better or best perspective. She argues instead, that perspectivism makes no claims about the cognitive equality of perspectives, and believes Nietzsche considered his own perspective to be superior in the just the way she describes. That is, Nietzsche sees his own perspective as better able to satisfy cognitive interests. As Clark explains,

"As I have interpreted it, perspectivism denies that we can compare perspectives either in

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<sup>65</sup> 1990, 29-31

<sup>66</sup> 1990, 130-9



terms of the way things are in themselves, or in terms of a single set of beliefs that is neutral with respect to all perspectives. In this section, I have been arguing that these denials do not rule out the possibility of a neutral perspective for any two conflicting perspectives, and therefore do not entail incommensurability. In that case, we have no basis for denying that Nietzsche did regard his own perspective as superior to its competitors.”<sup>67</sup>

Clark does not claim here that all perspectives are commensurable. Instead she offers that a variety of perspectives need not be considered incommensurable in the absence of one complete truth of which each are competing interpretations. A perspective can only be considered superior in terms of what it can do for occupants of a lesser perspective. Incommensurability would then only occur between perspectives that are not competing in any way, such that the truth of one does not threaten the truth of the other. Incommensurability as Clark describes it, does not therefore entail that one perspective falsifies others, and does not then entail the falsification thesis, as Danto claims.<sup>68</sup>

Maudemarie Clark’s interest in Danto’s discussion of Nietzsche’s critique of truth is an interest in taking the standard approach to perspectivism and using the primary intuitions of this approach to formulate her own analysis. Her consideration of Danto serves to set her own view in the context of Nietzsche scholarship, and her critique of Danto serves to distinguish her own views as an updated version of Danto’s discussion. Her focus on Danto’s distinction between theories of truth sets up the issue of her own division of correspondence theories of truth into metaphysical and minimal correspondence, which I will discuss in the next Chapter. She is also concerned to show that the falsification thesis, or what I refer to as the epistemological aspect of Nietzsche’s critique of truth, is not present in the final presentation of his view on truth. This point, she believes, is the strength of her argument for the ultimate consistency of Nietzsche’s views, and one that has been overlooked in previous investigations of Nietzsche.

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<sup>67</sup> 1990, 142

<sup>68</sup> 1990 140–4





While Clark makes some persuasive arguments against Danto's pragmatic theory of truth, I believe that her conclusions are prejudiced by her belief that a correspondence theory of truth is the only possible account of truth. I see this belief to be influenced by her reliance on the equivalence principle, which seems to me to overlook Nietzsche's point in his ontological critique of truth that to speak of the reality of things apart from their appearances is meaningless. Clark anticipates this kind of criticism with her discussion of the 'thing in itself', as compared to the 'thing itself'<sup>69</sup>, however, I believe that Clark mistakenly assumes a division between objects in this discussion that does not follow Nietzsche's assertions about the world as a world of becoming, rather than as a world of being. I disagree that a world of being could be made up of objects themselves, containing some existence to be made meaningful through the interpreting powers of a given perspective. I find Danto's assertion that the world as we understand it, containing subjects, objects, and laws is a function of the human perspective, or what Danto refers to as 'common sense' to be more consistent with Nietzsche's claim in such passages as GS 109-11, as well as GS 354<sup>70</sup> that subjects, objects, and laws do not exist in the world, but are anthropomorphisms of experience, made in an attempt to fit experience to logic and grammar.

A second issue that I believe to be problematic in Clark's account is her use of perspective interchangeably with ideas conveying idiosyncratic viewpoints of individuals. I believe that this indicates that she overlooks Danto's distinction between 'perspective' and 'individual viewpoint' in her discussion of his distinction between theories of truth. It seems to me that Clark's insistence on 'viewpoint' as the proper definition of perspective is not consistent with her discussion of the visual metaphor of perspective. Clark argues that the metaphor of

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<sup>69</sup> 1990, 82; Clark makes this distinction to support her distinction between minimal and metaphysical correspondence.

<sup>70</sup> Cited above, pages: 29, 35, 41



perspective serves to indicate that there are subjective contributions to knowledge, yet by seeing 'perspective' and 'viewpoint' as interchangeable, Clark introduces the need for common objects to be considered by interacting subjects. Danto's 'common sense' account makes it inconceivable that subjects and objects persist as entities outside of our perspective, and so the issue of commensurability for his analysis is a theoretical question entirely beyond perspective as we are able to understand it. I believe that Danto's view is better supported by Nietzsche's discussion of the constructed character of the subject/ object distinction, and his assertions that the world is only becoming, with 'being' serving as an aspect (or prejudice) of our perspective.<sup>71</sup>

Clark's reading of *perspective* as *viewpoint* is consistent with my reading of her account as an attempt to blend the interpretations of Nehamas and Danto to serve as the basis for her interpretation. The influence of Nehamas is apparent in Clark's interpretation in her understanding of perspectives as individual, as well as in her depiction of perspective as a metaphor, which I see as related to her distinction between 'things themselves' and 'things in themselves'. Clark uses Nehamas' objections to Danto to build her own objections and her own interpretation, yet offers a criticism of Nehamas' account that returns the focus of discussion to a view of objects by knowing subjects with the intent to show that Nietzsche *does* put forth a theory of truth.

Clark sees the arguments presented by Nehamas that attempt to make perspectivism consistent with Nietzsche's rejection of truth to be successful in defending anti-foundationalism against self-contradiction, but she argues that perspectivism is not simply Nietzsche's assertion of anti-foundationalism. She criticizes Nehamas' attempts to show that perspectivism not only entails the falsification thesis, but also that it is not ultimately self-refuting as a result as

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<sup>71</sup> 1990, 138-44; Clark's discussion of the incommensurability of perspectives indicates that perspectives are to be understood as the beliefs and interests of individual knowers.



inadequately supported by Nehamas' defense of anti-foundationalism. Clark argues that Nehamas' understanding of simplification does not defuse the problem presented by the falsification thesis, as the type of simplification that implies the falsification thesis requires much more of perspectivism than a rejection of foundationalism. Clark argues that Nehamas conflates different types of simplification in his discussion of falsification, and that his failure to distinguish between types of simplification leaves his account vulnerable to the types of criticisms he is attempting to defend Nietzsche against.

Clark sees Nehamas' interpretation of falsification to fail in its use of simplification to mean both that human beings form beliefs on only part of the data relevant to a given belief and that there can be no complete or final theory of knowledge. For Clark, the two are distinct, and have different implications. Clark sees the first type of simplification to imply that beliefs are rendered false only in the event of the revision of beliefs based on further collection of information. This form of simplification only introduces the possibility that our beliefs are false, but does not show them to be so. The second as well does not imply any necessary falsification of beliefs, as incomplete belief systems need not compete with one another. In both cases, Clark does not see simplification introducing the falsification that Nehamas intends. Clark distinguishes as well a third understanding of simplification, also used by Nehamas, which amounts to a combination of the first two. This third type of simplification involves confusion between allowing the possibility that a competing set of beliefs might be true for any set of beliefs, and the idea that for any set there is a non-competing set that is true.

Using both types of simplification interchangeably leaves Nehamas with the view that for any set of beliefs, there *is* a competing set that is true. It is this fact that must be ignored to pursue our cognitive interests, and this ignorance that Nehamas terms 'falsification'. For Clark,





Nehamas cannot argue that a refutation of perspectivism requires that it be shown to be *actually* false when his solution to the falsification thesis entails that any set of beliefs is as true as its very opposite. Simplification as detailed by Nehamas does not, on Clark's view, merely entail that our beliefs leave out incompatible beliefs, but that these incompatible beliefs are just as true as our own. If competing sets of beliefs are equally true, she concludes, then they are equally false. Rather than showing that there are perspectives differing from our own, Nehamas has shown that these differing perspectives compete with ours, making perspectivism much more than a claim that there is not one set of beliefs that all others simplify in one way. On Clark's view, Nehamas either reduces perspectivism to anti-foundationalism, which cannot account for falsification and truth, or offers a contradictory account of simplification. For Clark then, Nehamas' discussion of simplification neither resolves the issue of falsification, nor serves to defend perspectivism against the charge of self-refutation.<sup>72</sup>

Clark's rejection of Nehamas' solution to the falsification thesis indicates her concern to show that Nietzsche offers a theory of truth, as Danto has done. However, the theory of truth that she advances exhibits the influence of Nehamas in her rejection of the pragmatic theory of truth and assertion that Nietzsche is able to reject the thing in itself, while maintaining belief in truth in the minimal correspondence sense. Nehamas' example of the painting serves Clark's distinction between the thing in itself, or an object existing completely determined in addition to its appearance, and the thing itself, or objects that comes to be through experience having no independent determination beyond that experience. This distinction allows Clark to explicate the minimal correspondence theory as a correspondence between our beliefs and the condition of the world, without resorting to the metaphysical correspondence between beliefs and fully

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<sup>72</sup> 1990, 155-7





determined objects in themselves explicitly rejected by Nietzsche. Clark's minimal correspondence view offers only that the world exists independently of representations of it, a view she sees as the only theory of truth that avoids both metaphysical correspondence and subjective idealism.

Like Nehamas, Clark offers an interpretation of perspectivism in which perspective is a metaphorical presentation of Nietzsche's view on truth in which vision and cognition are offered as parallels to draw out the idea that 'knowing' is akin to 'seeing' something from a particular point of view. She understands the point of Nietzsche's perspectivist rendering of truth to be that knowledge is only to be understood as from a particular point of view and that one may not have any understanding devoid of a direction from which to interpret. Her view, she argues is counter to an understanding of the metaphor of perspective as the idea that an object comes to be determined by a multiplicity of views on it. In her view, Nietzsche's metaphor of perspective does not imply the thing in itself, as is implied by this 'omniperspectival' interpretation of perspectivism. She determines that Nietzsche's metaphor invites an awareness of the subjective contributions to knowledge rather than a limitation presented by subjectivity. She sees the metaphor of perspective as Nietzsche's effort to reject the thing in itself, having already called the purpose of it to understanding into question.<sup>73</sup>

The painting example that Nehamas uses to explicate his view of perspectivism is the type of omniperspectival view that Clark's 'visual metaphor' is a reaction to. While Nehamas' analogy serves to point out that there is not only one perspective, his image also implies a distinction between seeing objects as either constituted in themselves or constituted in

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<sup>73</sup> 1990, 128-31



experience. Clark makes this distinction by referring to the thing in itself as distinct from the thing itself. Discussion of this distinction allows her to separate versions of correspondence.

For Clark, the thing *in* itself is to be understood in the Kantian sense of being fully constituted and fully determined apart from any appearance that it might have, and as such, cannot be known. It is this definition of extra-mental objects that Nietzsche is rejecting, and, as Clark argues, is the definition that leads Danto to believe that Nietzsche rejects correspondence in any sense. Clark understands Danto's mistake to stem from his failure to distinguish between objects that are ontologically distinct from the experience of knowers (things themselves) and objects that are fully determined apart from the experience of them (things *in* themselves). This distinction serves Clark's distinction between minimal and metaphysical correspondence allowing for the possibility that beliefs might correspond to objects, as well as the possibility that truth is not independent of what can be known.<sup>74</sup>

A distinction between metaphysical and common sense realism sets up the distinction between metaphysical and minimal correspondence by separating the way something might be true in the metaphysical sense, from a common sense meaning of truth. In the former, Clark explains, the nature or essence of the world is not only independent of knowers, but also of what can be known. It would be possible, then for our best theory of knowledge to be false, as we are never able to know enough information about the thing in itself to be justified in believing that we have true beliefs about it. Common sense realism, on the other hand, holds that truth is a matter of what beliefs are justified at the ideal limits of inquiry, or what is true if we consider the highest satisfaction of our cognitive interests and exercise of our cognitive capacities. By cognitive interests, Clark means the things that make a theory desirable aside from truth, such as

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<sup>74</sup> 1990, 31-4



consistency or simplicity. Clark argues that metaphysical realism accepts the possibility that our beliefs could be false even if they satisfy our best possible cognitive interests. She believes however, that Nietzsche would have rejected as incoherent the idea that our assertions might still be false even if they fulfill our cognitive interests.<sup>75</sup>

Common sense realism is the belief that the world is not reducible to knowledge or representation, but is also not a collection of distinct entities to which facts or truths correspond. Instead, the world is distinct from experiencing subjects, and their experiences of the world, but it is the condition of the world rather than objects in the world themselves that stand in the relation of correspondence with beliefs. It is the condition of the world that makes things true. 'Facts' or 'truths' are what make up the world, and true beliefs are those that correspond to reality or the way the world is. In this, the world exists as something ontologically distinct from beliefs, but not as a collection of truths on objects with facts about the world making them true. Clark argues that both minimal correspondence and metaphysical correspondence theories of truth accept the equivalence principle and common sense realism, but only metaphysical correspondence includes metaphysical realism.<sup>76</sup>

Clark makes the distinction between metaphysical and minimal correspondence to show that rejection of the thing in itself does not require rejection of correspondence. Based on the equivalence principle, correspondence is the only type of truth theory acceptable if we are using truth in the accepted sense, and if we reject subjective idealism.<sup>77</sup> As Clark explains,

"My interpretation so far commits Nietzsche only to accepting the equivalence principle as governing our use of 'true' and to rejecting both subjective idealism (= accepting of

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<sup>75</sup> 1990, 47-51; Clark draws this distinction to support her discussion of anti-realism.

<sup>76</sup> 1990, 31-40

<sup>77</sup> 1990, 38-61





common sense realism) and the Cartesian assumption that we can make sense of the idea that a theory that best satisfies our cognitive interests might still be false.”<sup>78</sup>

Clark associates Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysical realism with Kant’s metaphysical realism, as she believes that both disagree that truth is something independent of our cognitive interests, even though it is independent of our cognitive capacities. She argues that Nietzsche, like Kant, believes that knowledge corresponds to things only as they are determined by our particular mode of understanding, and not in themselves.

The solutions of Danto and Nehamas to the self-reference problem in perspectivism set up the focus of Clark’s analysis by providing a background of common interpretations from which she can build her conclusion that Nietzsche ultimately accepts some form of truth in his later works. The chapter to follow will look at Clark’s discussion of Nietzsche’s progression between TL and his last six works, as well as offer criticisms of Clark’s conclusions. It is my belief that Clark’s account of Nietzsche’s progression accurately follows his eventual rejection of the thing in itself, and truth, but that her final rendering of perspectivism and the theory of truth she attributes to Nietzsche fail to accurately depict Nietzsche’s purpose in writing his critique of truth. I believe that Clark incorrectly seeks a theory of truth in perspectivism and overburdens perspectivism with epistemological questions as a result of overlooking the importance of the will to truth to Nietzsche’s critique. Clark’s search for an adequate theory of truth in Nietzsche’s texts overlooks Nehamas’ fundamental insight that Nietzsche’s use of hyperbole is the key to understanding his texts, as well as Danto’s interpretation of ‘common sense’.

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<sup>78</sup> 1990, 61



## Chapter Three Clark on Perspectivism and Self-reference

### 3.1 Perspectivism and Minimal Correspondence

Clarks' response to both Danto and Nehamas leads her to conclude that although Nietzsche does not accept a pragmatic criterion of truth, he does have a positive theory of truth. The goal of her analysis of perspectivism is to show that not only does Nietzsche accept some truths, but also that he puts forth a theory of truth that is anti-foundational in character, and that rejects metaphysical correspondence and the thing in itself. Clark believes the previous interpretations of Nietzsche have been too radical, and that his views are better understood as a Neo-Kantian theory of truth that employs 'perspective' as a metaphor for 'cognition'. Clark argues that Nietzsche's views on truth progressed from an understanding of 'truth' as metaphysical correspondence, to eventually defining truth as minimal or common sense correspondence. Clark maintains that Nietzsche's early denial of truth stems from his acceptance in TL of the existence of an unknowable thing in itself, which he ultimately rejects. For Clark, Nietzsche's final six works make no mention of the falsification thesis, and that he ultimately rejected his early denial of truth.

Clark sees TL as Nietzsche's rejection of truth, or rather, the work in which he rejects all possibility that our knowledge corresponds to features of the world that are independent of how they appear. Clark believes that much is to be found in the essay in favor of radical interpretations, but that her presentation of a progression of views is what ultimately supports her attributing a minimal correspondence theory of truth to him. What is important about TL for Clark is the way that Nietzsche's comparison of language and knowledge expresses his reliance on Schopenhauer's representational model of knowledge and how his rejection of the idealism



implicit in Schopenhauer's view exhibits his early acceptance of the thing in itself. Clark reads Nietzsche's insistence on the metaphorical and illusory nature of truth in TL as an expression of the view that our knowledge does not and cannot correspond to a metaphysical reality, even though such a reality does exist.

Clark sees the argument in TL to be made up of a proof for the non-existence of truth and a proof for the ascetic and life-denying character of a concern with logic. As Clark sees the basic issue in perspectivism to be the claim that there is no truth and no possibility of truth, or what she terms, the falsification thesis, she sees the critique of truth, or the claim that 'truths are illusions' as the key passage in TL. She argues contrary to radical interpretations of perspectivism that Nietzsche's assertion can neither be properly understood as a claim about the arbitrariness of language, nor as an expression of the metaphorical character of language, and that his denial of truth is therefore not a result of claims that Nietzsche makes about the character of language. Instead, she contends that the arguments that base Nietzsche's denial of truth in language are internally inconsistent. Both the depiction of language as metaphorical and as an arbitrary designation of words to things, overlook the dependency between metaphor and non-metaphor. Clark argues that in both cases Nietzsche cannot consistently claim that truth is a metaphor without also assuming that truth has, or at least has had in the past, a literal meaning corresponding to objects in the world. Without a literal meaning, metaphors do not have the force that comparison to literal meaning gives them.

Clark argues that 'truths are illusions' would then indicate a failure of beliefs in corresponding to the world rather than a failure of language in expressing the world. Nietzsche's denial of truth is instead based on both the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth and the representational model of perception that Nietzsche takes from Schopenhauer. The suggestion



that language is metaphorical is intended to indicate the character of perception as offering objects only as they appear instead of how they exist in themselves. Like metaphors, perceptions do not correspond to what they are intending to indicate. It is this concern with the failures of perception, Clark argues, that exhibits the influence of Schopenhauer. In this, Nietzsche's use of metaphor is itself a metaphorical depiction of the way perception interacts with objects. Clark interprets the 'metaphor' of the metaphorical character of perception to mean that what appears to us is only a representation of what is experienced according to subjective traits. Contrary to Schopenhauer's belief that these representations do not allow inference to objects independent of representation, Nietzsche only denies the *accessibility* of things in themselves in TL. Clark argues that although Nietzsche later distinguishes between things themselves and things *in* themselves, this distinction is not made in TL, leaving him to equate things existing independently of consciousness with the thing in itself. Clark argues that Nietzsche's rejection of truth on the grounds that our ideas do not correspond to things in themselves exhibits his assumption that truth requires correspondence to things in themselves, and acceptance of the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth in this early essay. Nietzsche's apparent assumption of the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth as the only possibility for truth allows space for Clark to defend her interpretation of his view as neo-Kantian<sup>79</sup>.

Clark argues that Kant accepts metaphysical realism, the view that the world is determined independently of experience, for the noumenal world, yet rejects it for the *phenomenal* world. On this account, Kant only accepted noumenal reality to be independent of both our cognitive capacities and our ideal methods of justification (cognitive interests). In other words, *only the thing in itself* is independent of our cognitive interests. In TL, Clark argues,

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<sup>79</sup> 1990, 62-85





Nietzsche holds the same view of the thing in itself as Kant, thereby accepting metaphysical realism. His acceptance of independently existing objects and his view that our experiences merely represent these objects leads Clark to the conclusion that he believes these objects to be independent both of our capacities to know them and our very best standards for justifying our theories about them. At this stage, he seems to believe that even if we had all the information about independently existing objects, we could still be mistaken about the truth of our beliefs due to the fact that our beliefs are mere representations. Clark concludes from this that the objects Nietzsche accepts are independent of both our cognitive capacities and interests, and therefore are things in themselves in the Kantian sense. Further support for the influence of Kantianism on Nietzsche comes from his genealogy of truth, and assertion that cognition develops in humans as a means for survival, Clark argues. It is the framework that we develop for cognition and ultimately, survival that shapes our cognitive interests and what we accept as true. Clark believes that Nietzsche's acceptance of truth as metaphysical correspondence stems from his belief that truth in itself has unlimited value, while the truths discoverable within the human cognitive framework possess a value limited by their scope. Nietzsche's rejection of metaphysical realism comes later with his rejection of the thing in itself, and acceptance of a neo-Kantian, common sense realism.

To track the development of Nietzsche's thought throughout his productive lifetime, Clark turns to HA, and Nietzsche's discussion of science as contrasted to BGE, GS, and GM. Nietzsche's acceptance of science in HA as the means to discovering the falsity of our beliefs leads Clark to conclude that Nietzsche believes science to be capable of achieving truth while concern with the thing in itself is unnecessary. Clark believes that Nietzsche's position in HA



moves toward a rejection of the thing in itself and of metaphysical correspondence, but that his rejection of the thing in itself does not appear until BGE 16, with:

“That ‘immediate certainty’ as well as ‘absolute knowledge’ and the ‘thing-in-itself’ involve a *contradictio in adjecto*, I shall repeat a hundred times; we really ought to free ourselves from the seduction of words!”<sup>80</sup>

Instead, HA introduces the distinction between the world of appearance and the metaphysical world. Clark argues that Nietzsche’s position on truth in HA is that our experience could possibly be wholly different from the metaphysical world, which she interprets as his acceptance of the thing in itself. By asserting the possibility of a metaphysical world, Clark reasons, Nietzsche is assuming that the world and the things in it are determined in complete independence of appearance, and are thereby things in themselves in the Kantian sense. Although Nietzsche affirms the existence of the thing in itself by means of a metaphysical world in both TL and HA, Clark sees the main difference between the focus of each work to be the subject of his ‘agnosticism’<sup>81</sup>. In TL, Nietzsche considers the possibility of truth upon admitting its existence, while HA considers the possibility of knowing a metaphysical world. For both, Nietzsche concedes their existence as well as the impossibility of ever knowing if our beliefs correspond to them. Clark explains that when compared,

“HA’s position on the metaphysical world is equivalent to TL’s agnosticism regarding truth. We cannot rule out the possibility that the truth differs radically from our best theory, but we cannot know whether or not it does. This means we cannot know whether or not our truths correspond to things in themselves or possess metaphysical truth.”<sup>82</sup>

This agnosticism is important for Clark as an indication that in both of these early works, he indicates the existence of the thing in itself, and consequently, the falsification thesis, but that later works do not give indication that this is the case.

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<sup>80</sup> BGE 16

<sup>81</sup> 1990, 99

<sup>82</sup> 1990, 99



Clark finds support in GS 54 for the rejection of the thing in itself in the passage from BGE 16, in the reappearance of the 'mysterious X'<sup>83</sup> from TL reformulated as appearance with no hidden essence:

"What is 'appearance' for me now? Certainly not the opposite of some essence: what could I say about any essence except to name the attributes of its appearance! Certainly not a mask that one could place on an unknown X and remove from it!"<sup>84</sup>

This passage indicates to Clark that Nietzsche has moved away from the representational view of knowledge. Rather than indicating that our understanding and beliefs are representations that obscure objects in themselves, Nietzsche's claim in GS 54 is apparently that essence and appearance are indistinguishable. Contrary to the representational model, what *appears* is all that an object is. Rejection of essences of things independent of their appearance is, for Clark, a rejection of a metaphysical world and the thing in itself. Clark concludes that textual evidence subsequent to GS indicates that Nietzsche's denial of the thing in itself led him to conclude that truth cannot be a matter of correspondence to things in themselves, and must therefore be correspondence to something else. For Clark, Nietzsche's rejection of metaphysical correspondence allows him to accept that our beliefs can be true.<sup>85</sup>

Clark argues that Nietzsche's reference to truths as illusions and denial of truth subsequent to BGE amount to a rejection of a priori metaphysical beliefs unrelated to common sense, scientific beliefs that he comes to accept as true. Any reference to truth as illusion in GM or after, Clark interprets as a critique of the position on truth Nietzsche held in TL. To make this argument, Clark cites TI III, 3, in which science is upheld as the only possibility for truth:

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<sup>83</sup> "In the same way that the sound appears in a sand figure, so the mysterious X of the thing in itself first appears as a nerve stimulus then as an image, and finally as a sound... We obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and actual; whereas nature is acquainted with no forms and no concepts and likewise with no species, but only with an X which remains inaccessible and undefinable for us." TL p.83

<sup>84</sup> GS 54

<sup>85</sup> 1990, 95-102





“And what magnificent instruments of observation we possess in our senses!... Today we possess science precisely to the extent that we have decided to accept the testimony of the senses - to the extent to which we sharpen them further, arm them, and have learned to think them through. The rest is miscarriage and not-yet-science - in other words, metaphysics, theology, psychology, epistemology – or formal science, a doctrine of signs, such as logic and that applied logic which is called mathematics. In them reality is not encountered at all, not even as a problem – no more than the value of such a sign-convention as logic.”<sup>86</sup>

This passage indicates to Clark that only the empirical sciences could provide truth, and that Nietzsche has at this point come to dissociate ‘truth’ from metaphysical correspondence. She interprets the ‘lie’ of reason to indicate ‘pure reason’ or a faculty divorced from sense experience and participation in the natural world. ‘Lie’ indicates to Clark the falsity of expecting the world to conform to grammar and exhibit unchanging substance, rather than the idea that knowledge falsifies the world. Philosophers’ beliefs that they had non-empirical access to the world led them to believe reality to differ in character from empirical evidence, and so ‘reason’ as a ‘non-natural’ faculty is a lie, and anything believed to be produced by it is false. However, this does not mean that *all* our beliefs are false. Clark concludes that this interpretation of ‘lie’ and ‘falsity’ is more plausible than the falsification thesis, given that Nietzsche has rejected the thing in itself by these later works and with it, the idea that human knowledge somehow ‘gets it wrong’ about the world.

As further evidence of Nietzsche’s progression between acceptance of the thing in itself, and rejection of truth, and his rejection of the thing in itself and acceptance of truth, Clark offers a reinterpretation of Nietzsche’s six stage discussion of the transformation of belief about the true world from the section *History of an Error* in TI to indicate Nietzsche’s own presentation of his progress:

1. “The real world, attainable to the wise, the pious, the virtuous man – he dwells in it, *he is it*. (Oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, convincing. Transcription of the proposition ‘I, Plato, *am* the truth.’

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<sup>86</sup> TI III,3



2. The real world, unattainable for the moment, but promised to the wise, the pious, the virtuous man ('to the sinner who repents'). (Progress of the idea: it grows more refined, more enticing, more incomprehensible – *it becomes a woman*, it becomes Christian...)
3. The real world, unattainable, indemonstrable, cannot be promised, but even when merely thought of a consolation, a duty, an imperative. (Fundamentally the same old sun, but shining through the mist and skepticism; the old idea grown sublime, pale, northerly, Königsbergian.)
4. The real world – unattainable? Unattained, at any rate. And if unattained also *unknown*, consequently also no consolation, no redemption, no duty: how could we have a duty towards something unknown? (The gray of dawn. First yawnings of reason. Cockcrow of positivism.)
5. The 'real world' – an idea no longer of any use, not even a duty any longer – an idea grown useless, superfluous, *consequently* a refuted idea: let us abolish it! (Broad daylight; breakfast; return of cheerfulness and *bon sens*; Plato blushes for shame; all free spirits run riot.)
6. We have abolished the real world: what world is left? The apparent world perhaps? ...But no! *with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world!* (Mid-day; moment of the shortest shadow; end of the longest error; zenith of mankind; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA)<sup>87</sup>

For her interpretation, Clark equates 'true world' with 'truth' and attempts to show how this selection must be interpreted as Nietzsche's abandonment of his denial of truth. She sees the transition between stages five and six as Nietzsche realizing that he had initially drawn the incorrect conclusion from his rejection of the thing in itself. Clark equates 'this world' with the empirical world, not simply what is accessible to human beings as in the first stage, because the true world can be accessible to some humans, according to the first stage. As he has rejected the true world as the metaphysical world, the empirical world is the only demonstrable world, which is again reference to the view that the world might differ from our best theory about it. Clark argues that the real issue in stage six is not the danger of nihilism but whether the empirical world is the object of true knowledge and therefore possesses 'true being'.

Clark argues that Nietzsche's views are present in stages four through six, with stage four clearly exhibiting Nietzsche's positivism, as per her account of HA. According to her account

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<sup>87</sup> TI p.51



of HA<sup>88</sup>, the metaphysical world could exist, but it has no function. She points out that in the fourth stage Nietzsche has not placed quotation marks around 'true world'. She also indicates that stage five relates to the ideas in GS and BGE with its denial of the existence of a true world. On her view, Nietzsche no longer has need for the true world, which is hostile to life. Stage five is not yet the end of the longest error as the true/apparent distinction is not abolished until stage six. As stage five includes BGE and GS and the idea that there is no truth and truth is only illusion, it allows the empirical world as the merely apparent, and therefore illusory, if another world is considered 'true'. Clark concludes that stage six is also Nietzsche's overcoming of his earlier denial of truth.

For Clark, this interpretation of Nietzsche's six stages offers a substantial piece of evidence for her developmental view. She determines that both *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and BGE exhibit his overcoming of his denial of truth, explicating the appearance of Zarathustra in stage six. This also shows that Nietzsche has overcome the ascetic ideal, which motivated his view that truth was illusion.<sup>89</sup>

In order to connect her reading of the six stages with perspectivism, and to underscore her claim that GM belongs in stage six, Clark argues that the statement of perspectivism in GM is a metaphorical expression of Nietzsche's neo-Kantian position on truth, designed to help us overcome falsification. Clark concedes that on one interpretation, perspectivism includes the falsification thesis, as allowing that all knowledge is perspectival seems to imply that human knowledge distorts reality in some way. In order to show that her own view is more plausible, Clark sets out to show that perspectivism is first a rejection of foundationalism, and second, a neo-Kantian theory of cognition that does not require a transcendental object of knowledge, yet

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<sup>88</sup> Clark here refers to HA 9

<sup>89</sup> 1990, 105-114





arrives at truth in the minimal correspondence sense.

Clark sees Nietzsche's expression of perspectivism as analogous to vision, and an expression of the neo-Kantian view that knowledge is shaped by human cognitive capacities. Perspective, on Clark's view, is not tied to interpretation as the ultimate ground of reality, but to the idea that a world exists outside human cognition that is interpreted according to our perspective. Our understanding of the world from a certain perspective is presented as analogous to seeing an object from a certain place. Once the thing in itself has been rejected, knowledge cannot be understood as limited by human perspective, as without the thing in itself, there is no absolute standard by which knowledge is to be judged. Clark offers one way in which the visual metaphor can be understood, which also serves to discount foundationalism. She cites GM III 12 as the passage most explicitly detailing the visual metaphor and rejection of foundationalism:

"From now on, my philosophical colleagues, let us be more wary of the dangerous old conceptual fairy-tale which has set up a 'pure, will-less, painless, timeless, subject of knowledge', let us be wary of the tentacles of such contradictory concepts as 'pure reason', 'absolute spirituality', 'knowledge as such': - here we are asked to think an eye which cannot be thought at all, an eye turned in no direction at all, an eye where the active and interpretive powers are to be suppressed, absent, but through which seeing still becomes seeing-something, so it is an absurdity and non-concept of eye that is demanded. There is *only* a perspective seeing, *only* a perspective 'knowing'; the *more* affects we allow to speak about a thing, the *more* eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our 'concept' of the thing, our objectivity. But to eliminate the will completely and turn off all the emotions without exception, assuming we could; well? would that not mean to *castrate* the intellect?..."

Clark interprets this passage as a metaphorical connection of vision to cognition as a means of rejecting foundationalism. She believes Nietzsche's point to be that our knowledge is only perspectival and that the idea of the non-perspectival viewpoint required by foundationalism is an absurd concept. She interprets 'knowledge as such' to mean 'knowledge of things in





themselves' and believes that Nietzsche refers to this as a contradictory concept to indicate his rejection of the belief in the thing in itself and thereby, also of metaphysical correspondence, which contains a justification for foundationalism<sup>90</sup>. Instead, Nietzsche offers the view that our beliefs shape our knowledge perspective, such that knowledge is contextual, and dependent on our other beliefs. While this would leave perspectivism without relation to truth, Clark argues, such anti-foundationalism concerns the *justification* (rational acceptability) of belief rather than truth or falsity, and makes an argument similar to that of Nehamas that the *possibility* of falsity does not necessarily entail that a belief is false.

To reconnect this view to truth, Clark explains that perspectivism must be interpreted as a rejection of metaphysical correspondence, but an acceptance of minimal correspondence. In TL, Nietzsche suggests that the influence of practical interests kept humans from ever reaching 'pure truth'. For Clark, however, perspectivism frees us from the idea that knowledge requires such 'pure truth', relying instead on a connection between beliefs and subjective factors such as our cognitive capacities and practical interests, to make up our cognitive perspectives. Clark sees Nietzsche making a strong connection between intellect and will, and the will and our practical interests in his discussion of knowledge. As Clark interprets Nietzsche's visual metaphor and his discussion of the thing in itself in BGE 16 to point to his rejection of both foundationalism and the idea of metaphysical correspondence, she sees perspectivism's connection to truth to be only in a minimal correspondence sense, or related to human cognitive interests.

Clark concludes that perspectivism thus rules out correspondence to things in

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<sup>90</sup> Clark uses the Kaufmann and Hollingdale translation of *On the Genealogy of Morals* in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, 555, New York, Random House (Modern Library) Press, 1968a. In this translation, 'knowledge as such' appears as 'knowledge in itself'.



themselves and truth in the metaphysical sense. Without this objective truth, Nietzsche has no reason to maintain the falsification thesis, yet by allowing that some beliefs could be true, perspectivism is therefore compatible with minimal correspondence. Clark claims that perspectivism is thus not the claim that our knowledge is limited by our limited capacities; it is an expression of the ways in which our human capacities and cognitive interests shape our beliefs about knowledge and what we consider to be true. Clark thereby places Nietzsche's discussion of perspectivism squarely within a discussion of human knowledge, drawing an analogy between vision and understanding. Limiting perspectivism in this way makes the problem of self-reference one of determining not how the world itself can be perspectival, but how differing worldviews might be perspectives on the same object. As there is no thing in itself, there is no object that might be falsified, and worldviews cannot be compared according to a standard outside of the standard of acceptability. Perspectivism is not subject to the dangers of relativism either, Clark argues, as within the boundaries of truth as acceptability, differing viewpoints might be compared to one another and perspectives changed or developed.<sup>91</sup>

Clark's discussion of anti-foundationalism implies that in addition to perspectivism being offered metaphorically, the self-reference problem misses the point of the discussion by looking for an ontological claim about the world, where Nietzsche is making an epistemological claim about the nature of human knowledge. As a result, Clark's discussion is not concerned with whether or not perspectivism is absolutely true. Clark is instead concerned to show that perspectives are a necessary condition of human knowledge, without reaching beyond the realm of human understanding and cognition. Clark's concern with Nietzsche's perspectivism is with the justification of belief and not with perspective as the ground of being. By arguing for minimal

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<sup>91</sup> 1990, 127-35



correspondence, Clark is looking for justification instead of truth, but making truth an internal requirement of human knowledge claims instead of the external correspondence to things in themselves. On this new account, truth is to be indexed to perspectives and systems of sentences, rather than an independent world of objects. 'Perspective' and 'perspectivism' take on the character of 'viewpoint' referring to the understanding of a particular subject of the world.

Setting up the problem of self-reference as a problem within the scope of human cognition alone, Clark's analysis requires evidence that Nietzsche rejected the falsification thesis later in life, as well as verification of his acceptance of a minimal correspondence theory of truth. She believes that her account of Nietzsche's intellectual progression from TL to GS and his final works provides such evidence. Clark maintains that such proof rescues Nietzsche from the untenable position that perspectivism places him in, showing that self-reference understood in terms of the inherent falsity of human understanding is self-defeating, but is not accepted by Nietzsche in his final understanding of truth.

### **3.2 Against attributing the Minimal Correspondence view to Nietzsche**

The failing that I see in this account by Professor Clark lies in her focus on the possibility of perspectivism as an epistemological doctrine to the exclusion of Nietzsche's critique of the psychological requirement of truth for creatures such as we are. Although I agree with Clark that Nietzsche initially accepts and eventually rejects the Kantian thing in itself, I do not agree that this requires acceptance of the equivalence principle and a minimal correspondence view of truth, nor do I agree that this should be the primary focus of a discussion of perspectivism. I come to this conclusion because I see the assumptions that she must make to attribute these theses to Nietzsche as being in conflict with Nietzsche's critique of truth. Following the lead of Steven





Hales and Rex Welshon, I will argue that the theory of truth that Clark attributes to Nietzsche is internally inconsistent. As well, I believe that Clark mistakenly assumes perspectivism and perspectives to be subject driven, which stems from her assumption of the subject as independent of the object, and alternating 'perspective' and 'viewpoint'. For this, I look to the criticisms made by Christoph Cox concerning the *subject* of perspectivism. I believe that Clark's misapprehension of the subject leads her away from Nietzsche's point about the construction of the subject through experience. I see Nietzsche's view of truth to be not a question of the interaction between subject and object, but a question of the way that subjectivity comes to be determined in the world and the purpose that truth serves in this determination. Following Babette Babich, I will argue that Clark's focus on the epistemological critique of truth overlooks Nietzsche's intent in critiquing truth and the philosophical tradition. It is my belief that focus on the type of truth acceptable to Nietzsche may take into account the assertions concerning truth made throughout his productive lifetime without seeing the point of the discussion to be not a simple rejection of the possibility of truth, but a reformulation of the question to ask why truth is taken to have unlimited value. To put forward a theory of truth on his behalf is to automatically assume this value. While it may be possible to formulate a consistent approach to truth in Nietzsche that fits with perspectivism, I do not see Professor Clark's view as accomplishing this objective.

### **3.2.1 Steven D. Hales and Rex Welshon**

Criticizing Clark's imposition of the minimal correspondence view, Hales and Welshon counter that the conclusions drawn by Clark assume a definition of 'truth' that already discounts the critique offered by Nietzsche. Hales and Welshon charge that as Clark believes that the only



plausible definition of truth must be truth in some correspondence sense, she can only attribute truth to claims about an independently existing object in the world, for which the relation is to hold. Hales and Welshon see this imposition of extra-perspectival entities as unsupported by, and even explicitly rejected in Nietzsche's texts. They argue that the equivalence principle cannot be applied to perspectivism and that Clark inadequately defends the connection between minimal correspondence and perspectivism. They argue that the inconsistencies in Clark stem from her belief that correspondence is the only plausible theory of truth.

In order to make her case for the connection between minimal correspondence and the world as a collection of perspectives, Clark indexes truth to perspectives, rather than to the thing in itself, independent of perspective. She thus redefines truth to be related to circumstances within a given perspective, rather than determined independently of perspectives, a definition inspired and supported (she believes) by her reading of Donald Davidson. Hales and Welshon admit that Clark's claim that Nietzsche rejected metaphysical correspondence in favor of minimal correspondence does seem reasonable, as perspectivism is the view that truth is perspectively indexed, but argue that a closer inspection of Davidson's discussion of Tarski's convention T reveals that both Davidson and Tarski reject the idea that truth can be indexed to perspectives. Hales and Welshon point out that Tarski's discussion of indexing truth extended only to languages, and Davidson rules out any form of relative truth. Reference to a recent claim by Davidson indicates that truth requires a determinate arrangement of the world, and cannot be relative to a perspective.<sup>92</sup> Thus Clark's application of the equivalence principle to her own minimal correspondence view is expressly rejected by Davidson, to whom Clark credits her interpretation. Hales and Welshon argue that as Clark's attempt at reconciling the critique with

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<sup>92</sup> Hales and Welshon cite Davidson, 1986:309.



Nietzsche's positive assertions about states of affairs in the world involves the separation of the critique of metaphysics from the falsification thesis that relies on the equivalence principle as the definition of truth, this inconsistent use of the principle undermines Clark's conclusion that Nietzsche can only plausibly accept minimal correspondence if he is to refer to truth. Hales and Welshon further maintain that even without this inconsistency, Clark assumes that perspectivism can be conjoined with minimal correspondence, yet that this does not follow from her discussion, and she makes no express argument to support her claim.

Hales and Welshon interpret Clark's willingness to conjoin perspectivism and minimal correspondence with Nietzsche's apparent acceptance of science as offering truth in GM, TI, and A. Clark sees Nietzsche's discussion of science in these works as evidence that human cognition does have some access to truth and knowledge as evidenced by his praise of the sciences that require sense experience. However, they point out that while Nietzsche does endorse science to some extent in these, his endorsement cannot be considered unconditional, and he offers more negative discussion of science as truth than positive. They contend that Nietzsche saw science as perspectival as well, and not as Clark argues, the basis for human knowledge.

Finally, Hales and Welshon question Clark's assertion that the acceptance of perspectivism does not allow for the falsification thesis, and as a result, the falsification thesis must be rejected by Nietzsche. Hales and Welshon regard Clark's claim that falsification entails metaphysical correspondence as plainly false, and the above discussion finds Clark's defense of minimal correspondence serving as the truth of perspectivism inadequate. Hales and Welshon see Clark's worry about the falsification thesis resting on her contention that to understand our





beliefs as false is to reject logic altogether.<sup>93</sup> Hales and Welshon argue that Clark need not require Nietzsche to reject logic outright, as logic is a matter of both syntax and semantics. While Nietzsche rejects semantics which refer expressions to perspectivally independent objects that does not mean that he also rejects logical syntax. Hales and Welshon explain,

“If perspectivism is true, the referents of our expressions are entities that we, by occupying perspectives, have created to serve as these referents. Moreover, there is then a plausible way of interpreting the falsification thesis consistent with perspectivism. On this interpretation, the falsification thesis is the thesis that expressions do not refer to extra-perspectival entities.”<sup>94</sup>

Logical syntax can still be a key element in our cognition if we understand the universe of discourse for logical statements to exclude extra-perspectival entities. Like Danto, Hales and Welshon see ‘truth’ used in different ways by Nietzsche and argue that the falsification thesis is not intended to include them all.

On this interpretation of the falsification thesis, Nietzsche is indicating that our beliefs are false if, by true, we mean indexed to extra-perspectival entities. In other words, truths are illusions if we assume that truths refer to objects in themselves, as they are independent of perspective, or assume even that such things exist. Granting both perspectivism and the falsification thesis so understood, Hales and Welshon argue that Nietzsche’s understanding of truth requires more than just the sentences required by convention T, it also requires some perspective to which the truth of those sentences is to be indexed<sup>95</sup>. From this discussion, Hales and Welshon conclude that Clark can claim neither that Nietzsche rejects the falsification thesis in favor of minimal correspondence, nor that he is required to do so to have truth at all.

The argument that Hales and Welshon make concerning the internal inconsistency of

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<sup>93</sup> 1990, 66

<sup>94</sup> 2000, 30

<sup>95</sup> 2000, 25-30





Clark's account is, on my view, very similar to the argument made by Clark against the pragmatic view of truth offered by Danto. Clark charges Danto with denying the equivalence principle and redefining truth to mean something different than our common usage. I believe that Clark's account of minimal correspondence, as connected to perspectivism is guilty of the same offence. I agree with Hales and Welshon that the equivalence principle is not applicable to minimal correspondence and perspectivism. Clark's discussion of the role of cognitive interests links perspectivism back to the pragmatic point that I interpret Danto to be making, while her view that truth is internal to perspective does not adhere to the equivalence principle as she has defended it.

Clark argues that for Danto, Nietzsche is claiming that truth is nothing more than the facilitation of life. She argues that this pragmatic approach redefines truth by making it a matter of utility, which is expressly denied by Nietzsche, as well as being internally inconsistent. However, Clark argues that perspectivism is an epistemological claim about the character of human cognition, and cites his genealogy of cognition in support of this. She maintains that for Nietzsche, perspectives are the universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of knowledge, and that the metaphor of perspective serves to point out the contributions to our understanding that our subjective cognitive framework makes in our interpretations and understanding. It is this point that she believes makes Nietzsche's theory of truth Neo-Kantian. On this account, what is true is a matter of what is taken to be true, or what is 'acceptable' within a given perspective. Truth is then a correspondence between the 'way' the world is experienced within a perspective and what the most acceptable explanation is, among several possible explanations. Without the thing in itself, there can be no question of appealing to extra-perspectival truth. Clark argues that what is accepted as true within a perspective is a matter of



meeting our highest standards of justification or rational acceptability. What we take as true is therefore dependent on our cognitive interests. Referring to Nietzsche's genealogical account, Clark argues that our cognitive interests develop evolutionarily, as does the cognitive framework by which we come to interpret our experience. The evolution occurs as a means to facilitating our movement in the world. From her description of the role of our cognitive interests in truth, it would seem that what we take to be true results from what makes us better equipped to move about in and interpret our world. What we call truth on this account is what facilitates life.

It is not clear from her account why 'truth as acceptability' would not include pragmatic concerns or utility as cognitive interests that further life and determine what it means to be true in a given perspective. Her argument instead points out that pragmatic concerns are of the utmost importance for deciding what is to be considered true. Her account seems to reinforce Danto's pragmatic theory, rather than deny it, by making truth dependent on perspective and cognitive interests.

Should we choose to accept that Clark is making her claims about truth from within a minimal correspondence theory, as distinct from a pragmatic theory of truth, as well as accept that correspondence is the only possibility for truth, discounting a pragmatic theory, Clark's 'truth as acceptability' does not itself seem to adhere to the equivalence principle. Clark argues that Danto's pragmatic theory redefines truth in defiance of the equivalence principle by denying that truth is an accurate depiction of what is the case. By indexing truth to perspectives, Clark offers us a definition of truth that explains not simply what *is the case*, but what is the case according to a particular perspective, given the influence of a cognitive framework. Our beliefs in this case are only linked to the condition of the world as experienced according to our cognitive perspective. We could accept that such statements as 'snow is white' are true, if in fact our experience is of



white snow, so called because of the way we experience things. However, if we must insist on some fact of the matter, it is difficult to see how minimal correspondence avoids the snares of metaphysical correspondence. The force of Nehamas' discussion of seeing an object from different perspectives lay in his pointing out that there simply is no fact of the matter about the painting. The minimal correspondence view makes the same point of denying a fact of the matter about the way an object is independent of its situation. We cannot then claim that there is some fact about the world, even the world within our perspective to which these beliefs correspond. Truth within a perspective would then not be making a claim about what is the case, as demanded by the equivalence principle. Correspondence would only be to the appearance.

Her particular interpretation of Nietzsche as holding a Neo-Kantian view of cognition, and her substitution of 'viewpoint' and 'perspective' seems to overlook the basic Kantian proposal that the cognitive framework shaping our interpretation of the world is held in common to all rational creatures understanding the world in the way that we do. Clark's attempt to offer a way to compare perspectives by their rational acceptability seems to overlook her basic insight that our cognitive interests are shaped by our perspective. There is no way to transcend a specialized mode of understanding the world to consider even the possibility of the way something might be according to a different perspective. I believe that this rules out the possibility that perspectives can be understood as individual, instead of as a 'common sense' as explicated by Danto. This leads me to the second issue that I have with Clark's account, that is, her reliance on the subject as distinct from a world of objects.

### **3.2.2 Christoph Cox**

Should we accept that perspectives can be considered to be more individual than held in





common, such an interpretation of perspective must assume a stable subject of cognition, creating a constant and extra-perspectival entity to fill perspectives and fulfill the visual metaphor Clark attributes to Nietzsche. Christoph Cox argues that Clark's interpretation of perspectivism fails to take into account Nietzsche's critique of the atomic soul by offering a Kantian account, which assumes the self as a formal requirement for reason. Cox sees Clark's interpretation as oversimplifying Nietzsche's discussions of both perspective and interpretation, by assuming a stable subject when Nietzsche denies the existence of stable subjects and objects, as well as a given distinction between them, in such passages as TI Reason 5, where Nietzsche explicitly states that our certainty in the existence of 'unity, identity, permanence, substance, cause, thinghood' is the cause of error<sup>96</sup>. Cox argues that by associating perspective with the visual metaphor, Clark attributes a stable subject to perspectives and interpretation, which Nietzsche questions elsewhere.<sup>97</sup> Perspective, as Cox defines it, is Nietzsche's general theory of interpretation, where his broad understanding of both perspectivism and interpretation merge the two. Cox argues that the subject of perspectivism is no more stable than the object, and that each are defined in interaction and interpretation. In other words, the Nietzschean subject is itself a collection of interpretations.

For Cox, what is important about GM III 12 is Nietzsche's discussion of the distinction between a thing's origins and its current usage, and not the visual metaphor, as Clark concludes. In this passage Nietzsche considers as well the way the origins of things and their current purposes are very different, as existing things are under the influence of the various forces of the world, and always thereby subject to change and newer interpretations. Cox argues that existence involves interpretation not only as understood by particular subjects, but that these

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<sup>96</sup> TI 'Reason' in Philosophy, 5

<sup>97</sup> Cox cites: TI III,5; TI VI 3; BGE 12, 16, 19, 34, 54 and GM I 13



events are constituted by interpretations. As Cox explains,

“ ‘Perspective’ for Nietzsche comes to characterize the directedness of a particular form of life toward conditions that preserve and enhance it, conditions that are codified in the interpretation that directs the perspective.”<sup>98</sup>

The thing or event is only to be understood as manifestations of the will to power, that is, as a consequence of the struggle among interpretations. For Cox, perspective is, as Nietzsche claims in BGE 11, the basic condition of life, that which extends to interpret and reinterpret.<sup>99</sup> The insight to be gained from GM II, 12, Cox argues, is not that a stable human subject gains a different cognitive perspective by considering differing cognitive interests, but that the subject itself is not ontologically prior to objects and interpretation, and does not remain stable throughout interpretation. It comes to be through understanding and develops relative to those interpretations.

For Cox, the mistake of positing an individual human knower lies in positing an absolute given subject experiencing the world, yet separated from its contingencies. As Nietzsche rejects the idea that there can be objects in the world existing independently of various interpretations of them, as well as rejecting a view of the soul as indestructible and eternal, the only way that the human subject can be understood is as essentially relational and contingent as all other entities in the world.<sup>100</sup> Cox points out that the view of the unified subject was seen by Nietzsche to conflict with human psychology in which humans are collections of conflicting impulses rather than a unified subject. Cox argues that Nietzsche takes up this argument from those of Hume and Kant concerning our lack of experience of a specific subject. Whereas Kant ultimately posited a noumenal self and noumenal causality, Cox explains, Nietzsche instead came to

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<sup>98</sup> 1999, 117

<sup>99</sup> 1999, 117

<sup>100</sup> BGE 12, 16, 17, 19, 34



understand our notion of an atomic self as stemming from grammatical habit. We have no justified belief in anything beyond the becoming and appearances that we experience, and it is the fault of our language that we seek to posit a given being behind such becoming.<sup>101</sup> Cox explains that Nietzsche is not offering a complete rejection of language with perspectivism, but a reconstruction of the concept of subjectivity.

Cox sees Clark's mistake as stemming from viewing perspective as something akin to the vision of the world of an individual knower, when perspective is to be better understood as a relational arrangement of affects and appearances according to other affects and appearances rather than the view of a single, atomic subject. A subject cannot be understood as a unified given in the face of Nietzsche's understanding of the world as relational and interpretive. To posit an individual subject is to posit an absolute, independent of any perspective on it. Cox explains that Nietzsche understood the subject of perspectives as unions of affects, each with its own interpretation. The subject cannot be understood as something beyond the union of affective perspectives on it. It can only be understood as fabricated by a particular interpretation from other unions of affects. Cox argues that Nietzsche explicitly rejects an atomic view of the self and Clark's discussion does not adequately account for this rejection. To assume an individual subject of perspective in the way that Clark does, assuming a Neo-Kantian interpretation of perspectivism, oversimplifies the interpretive nature of perspective and offers an extra-perspectival entity interpreting within a perspectival framework.

Cox's discussion of perspective limits perspective to conflicting modes of interpretation within a subject that comes to be determined by that conflict and interpretation. Although I disagree that perspective is to be construed so narrowly, I agree with him that the subject is

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<sup>101</sup> Cox cites BGE 12, 16, 17, 19, 34, and 54 as further sources of Nietzsche's discussion of the misleading subject-predicate form of language; Cox, 1994, 279-80





immanent in the world, and is not intended by Nietzsche to be understood as somehow separate from the objects of interpretation. This is not to be understood as a form of subjective idealism, in which objects are representations made by the subject. Rather, the subject and object are constituted together and are interdependent. Nietzsche's claim in TI Reason, 5 refers to the distinction of subject and object as a result of the prejudice in favor of being:

"We enter a realm of crude fetishism when we summon before consciousness the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language, in plain talk, the presuppositions of reason. Everywhere it sees a doer and a doing; it believes in will as the cause; it believes in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and it projects this faith in the ego-substance upon all things—only thereby does it first create the concept of 'thing'."<sup>102</sup>

In this passage, Nietzsche questions the assumption that there exists a subject acting and willing in the world as an independent substance. I see his reference to 'crude fetishism' as indicating that distinctions between the subject and object, as well as between the appearances experienced by the subject and the reality of the object stems from the desire to interpret the world, and the belief that the activity of interpretation requires that there is a possible 'correct' interpretation. By favoring stable existence, including a stable subject, reason posits something in the world that exists in itself, independent of the effect of interpretation on it. Nietzsche's point concerning the subject, as I see it, is that our belief in the subject is one more aspect of the way that we interpret the world and locate ourselves in it. When we assume a subject making judgments or having cognitive interests, we are overlooking the psychological claims Nietzsche makes about the development of the subject and the development of understanding as a means to creating meaning in the world. Assuming the importance of justification and the interaction of the subject and object discounts the psychological aspect of Nietzsche's critique of truth by failing

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<sup>102</sup> TI 'Reason' in Philosophy, 5.





to call into question the very use of discovering truth, and the reason that truth is to be accorded any value at all, independent of the value it has for us.

I see perspectivism as not simply calling into question the possibility of the thing in itself and its relation to the subject as focused on by Clark, but more the place of 'truth' independent of our particular cognitive framework. Nietzsche's psychological critique calls into question the place of truth in inquiry and leaves open the possibility that it is only part of our particular perspective to expect such things as truth, stability, substance, unity, permanence, and cause. Limiting perspectivism to an epistemological discussion discounts the critique as a whole by assuming both the subject-object distinction and truth as valuable, instead of calling both into question as Nietzsche does.

### **3.2.3 Babette Babich**

Babette Babich connects the constructedness of the subject to the critique of will to truth, challenging Clark's assessment of Nietzsche's perspectivism on the grounds that Clark erroneously attributes a theory of knowledge to Nietzsche, failing to adequately address Nietzsche's opposition to truth-seeking and denial of truth. She charges Clark's appraisal of perspectivism with failing to assess Nietzsche's account of knowledge from within what she refers to as the 'ecophysiological ground of knowledge', or the constructed nature of human understanding outlined by Nietzsche in TL. This refers to Nietzsche's discussion in his earlier works of the way human interpretations of the world come to be understood as true, and how these interpretations serve us in our movement in the world. Clark's interpretation, according to Babich, fails to take into account the constructed nature of 'true' and 'false' designations. When we consider Nietzsche's discussion of 'lie', Babich explains, we see that he is not replacing 'truth'



with 'lie', but asserting that we ought to suspend our ill judgments of lies and lying. She defines this as, "looking to the truth of illusion rather than the illusion of truth."<sup>103</sup> That is, we should not understand his claim, as Clark does, to be simultaneously asserting and denying truth, but as illuminating our misapprehension of our interpretations. Nietzsche is then challenging our belief in the ultimate power of knowledge and opposing the tenability of the epistemic project. Babich takes Nietzsche's discussion of truth from TL through GS in which our system of communication effects how we view the world, not as proof for attributing a Neo-Kantian minimal correspondence theory to Nietzsche, but as evidence of his genealogical approach to philosophy exemplified in his discussion of morality. Babich comes to this view from an understanding of Nietzsche's world as a world of relations, which explains his assertion that the world is the will to power. Each center of force and striving is affected by every other center, and humans participate in this universal dynamic. Our participation is what accounts for our success in the world<sup>104</sup>. Babich explains that for Nietzsche then, everything that exists is a moral or interpretive perspective. Clark's claim that Nietzsche rejects ontological truth, but not truth itself, results from a denial of the coherence of Nietzsche's various representations of truth, but Babich argues, Nietzsche's concern with truth is the ground of truth.<sup>105</sup> Clark's account refers to the possibility of knowledge based on perspective, but she maintains that perspectivism can be reconnected with truth in a minimal correspondence sense. Babich concludes that Clark's account overlooks Nietzsche's ultimate calling into question of the project of truth-seeking with her attribution to him of the minimal correspondence view. Clark re-establishes a meaning for truth within the context of Nietzsche's claims without looking at the critique as more than a critique of human knowledge.

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<sup>103</sup> 1994, 78

<sup>104</sup> Babich cites GS 46 in support of this interpretation.

<sup>105</sup> 1994, 75-80



Clark's failing for Babich is in limiting Nietzsche's critique of truth to the possibility of assessing truths without raising the larger question of the need for and possibility of truth as such.

Clark seeks to re-establish the meaning of truth for Nietzsche without addressing the necessity of truth for knowers, overlooking the psychological aspect of the critique of truth. I agree with Babich that the critique of truth-seeking is primary, making consideration of the ultimate meaning of truth secondary to its value. Clark's view thus neglects the primary focus of the critique of truth by offering a new version of truth without questioning the need for it. I see this as stemming from Clark's discussion of GM III 12, and her interpretation of perspectivism as highly metaphorical, referring to the way cognitive framework and cognitive interests shape interpretation and understanding. Clark argues against the view that perspectivism is a point about the possibility of there being different ways of understanding the world, offering instead the idea that cognition is necessarily finite. Understanding perspective in this way requires the subject as the ground of cognition, as having a perspective, and interpreting the world according to it. Clark's interpretation of GM III, 12, which leads her to explicate perspective as a simple metaphor includes interpreting Nietzsche's statement 'knowledge in itself' as 'knowledge of things in themselves', ultimately concluding that Nietzsche equates knowledge of things in themselves with non-perspectival knowledge, and is offering a warning against belief in non-perspectival knowledge. Clark concludes that this presentation of perspectivism denies the falsification thesis, and that Nietzsche does not mention the idea that truths are illusions in his later works.

I see 'knowledge in itself' as better interpreted to mean 'knowledge as such' than expanded to 'knowledge of things in themselves'. Nietzsche's warning against knowledge as such, is a warning against seeking a meaning for knowledge apart from what is known as experienced. Seeking knowledge itself does not make a claim about the situation of the subject





in relation to objects, it is a warning concerning the need to attribute intrinsic value to knowledge and truth. Nietzsche's claim that truths are illusions cannot be understood as a simple claim about the falsity of belief. As Clark points out, Nietzsche's ontological and epistemological views seem to be inconsistent in the face of his critique of metaphysics. However, his critique is not limited to a critique of metaphysics. It is also a critique of the value of truth. The falsification thesis is not intended by Nietzsche, as Clark believes, to indicate that human knowledge cannot correspond to an existent thing in itself. Instead, his discussion of the thing in itself can only be taken as part of his ontological critique of truth, and having secondary importance to his point that truths are illusions in that we believe truth to be of primary importance, when the value of truth itself should be called into question. 'Truths are illusions' is not a claim about the falsity of belief, but a claim about erroneously believing truth to be the ideal of rational acceptability, when truth is not necessarily connected to our mode of being in the world. Nietzsche's point seems to be that participation in the world is of primary importance, and such things as unity, substance, and truth come to be through that participation. Such things cannot be understood as given apart from a mode of interpretation, or perspective.



## Conclusion

In this thesis, I have argued that Nietzsche's perspectivism is best understood as only part of his overall critique of truth, and not the primary expression of his view on truth. I have distinguished between three aspects of Nietzsche's critique of truth: psychological, ontological, and epistemological to show the primacy of Nietzsche's critique of *the will to truth* to his ontological and epistemological assertions. I have considered solutions to the apparently self-contradictory nature of perspectivism, understood as the view that meaning and truth are ultimately dependent on perspective, as there is no single determined understanding of the world, to determine the theoretical compatibility of Nietzsche's critique of truth and perspectivism. I have argued that by distinguishing the psychological aspect of Nietzsche's critique from the expression of perspectivism that comes out of his epistemological and ontological critiques of truth, the question of the truth or falsity of perspectivism takes a secondary place in his critique to his concern with the utility of truth to life. Perspectivism as a theory of truth instead serves to point out Nietzsche's calling into question of the idea of non-relational knowledge; that is, knowledge that is not related to cognition within the bounds of life. By calling into question this idea, Nietzsche calls into question not just the attainability and 'utility' of truth, but the very intelligibility of the God's eye view.

My discussion of Nietzsche's critique of truth seeks to challenge the standard presentation of perspectivism as a positive theory of truth, as exemplified by the interpretation offered by Maudemarie Clark. I have argued against the plausibility of attributing a 'less radical' positive theory of truth to Nietzsche, and that Clark's understanding of perspectivism as a minimal correspondence view of truth is internally inconsistent. As such, I believe that Clark's attempt to make perspectivism into a consistent theory of truth inadequately fulfills this project. As I argue in



Chapter One, the point of Nietzsche's critique of truth is not an effort on his part to present a theory of truth, but an attempt to draw attention to the relational character of knowledge, as well as to question the value of truth. From my reading of Clark's response to Danto, I believe that Clark's attention to distinguishing the critique of metaphysics from the falsification thesis in Danto's account mistakenly turns her attention away from Danto's insight about Nietzsche's key project of overcoming the search for truth in itself. I also see her project of responding to Danto as leading her to neglect Nehamas' insight that Nietzsche is not offering a theory of truth, but offering a way of expressing experience and interpretation. I believe that Clark's inattention to Nietzsche's assertions that he is primarily a psychologist lead her to misrepresent the psychological aspect of his critique and to take the question of the meaning of truth to be primary to Nietzsche's question of the need for truth. This, I see as the major failing of her critique. Nietzsche's perspectivism can only be understood within his critique of the will to truth, rather than in the opposite way that Clark suggests. The inconsistency of Clark's account, therefore, is a result of her overlooking the importance of the psychological aspect of Nietzsche's critique of truth.

Against each interpretation of Nietzsche's perspectivism, I have reservations about any attempt to show perspectivism as 'true' that does not seriously consider his critique of truth-seeking as well as his critique of truth. As I interpret Clark, her interpretation offers an inadequate account of his critique of truth-seeking, focusing instead on the possibility of truth in perspectivism. The possibility is a common thread in the views that attempt to find a coherent view within Nietzsche, that is, the attempt to find some justification for perspectivism according to a true and false schema. From my reading of Nietzsche's critique of truth, I believe that Nietzsche's view is that there is no escaping perspective, and no God's eye view from which to



determine the truth or falsity of an entire perspective outside of its internal coherence. Without the thing in itself as a referent, such an outside view is not only improbable, it becomes impossible. The difficulty with accepting perspectivism stems from Nietzsche's persistent allusions to the truth of ideas in the face of his critique of truth and truth-seeking. One possible explanation of this is that Nietzsche tends to shift his discussion between truth in the metaphysical sense and truth in the value laden sense of perspectivism. This 'multiple use of truth' interpretation is common to the many interpretations of Nietzsche, including Danto, Nehamas, Cox, and Babich. Truth in a perspective is that which is taken as true within that perspective, and ultimately, what is true within that perspective. Based on my reading of Nietzsche's rejection of the true-apparent world dichotomy, I understand his point to be that there is no way to understand 'taken as true' within a perspective apart from the assertion of meaning ascribed to it. Drawing a distinction between what *is taken* as true and what *is* true moves outside of perspective to an extra-perspectival ground.

What Clark understands as the falsification thesis cannot be referring to anything outside of perspective and perspectival interpretation. Nietzsche's claim that human knowledge is falsifying cannot be the claim, as Clark understands it, that human knowledge offers an incorrect assessment of the world. It also does not seem probable that this falsification refers to the simplification of experience by human knowledge. As Clark points out, the latter view requires a substantial view of the world as well. The falsifying nature of human knowledge must be irreducibly tied to Nietzsche's critique of truth-seeking. Understood in this way, Nietzsche's claim that knowledge falsifies amounts to a claim that knowers with our sort of cognitive apparatus will always seek some truth about the world, even if we come to see that there is no determined nature or essence of the world to discover truths about. As with his statement in GS 58 that we





cannot destroy without creating, there is no way for us to continue to invest meaning without seeking truth. His critique of truth serves to indicate the value-laden nature of understanding, but also illustrates the inescapability of perspective. Perspectivism is only to be understood as a theory of truth with the understanding that the question of the meaning of 'truth' is inescapable and informed by a specific mode of interpretation.

Nietzsche's challenge is to the ideal of truth as non-relational and absolute independent of cognition and of life. Even if Nietzsche's views as a whole cannot be made consistent with one another, his idea that knowledge must begin from within a cognitive framework and the challenge this poses to a view of truth as absolute cannot and should not be overlooked. Nietzsche is calling into question the view that truth has the highest value, when it is life itself that allows for inquiry and the search for truth at all. His epistemological and ontological critiques serve to call into question the primacy of truth and to finally reject the notion that transcendent truth is possible at all, leaving life as the standard for value. Nietzsche cannot be understood to be equating life or utility to life with truth because 'truth itself' is meaningless independent of movement in the world and interpretation relative to life. Perspectivism, it seems, need not be consistent with Nietzsche's critique of truth in order to offer a significant challenge to traditional philosophy because the question that Nietzsche is attempting to answer is not, 'what is true of the world,' but, 'why is *truth* the goal of rational inquiry and why is truth accorded such value?'

I have not, then, argued that perspectivism can be re-interpreted and thereby understood to be consistent with Nietzsche's critique of truth. What I have argued is that Nietzsche's critique of truth is more than an expression of his ontological and epistemological views, and that by overlooking the psychological aspect of his critique of truth, Clark cannot make Nietzsche's perspectivism into a coherent and consistent view.



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